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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE SALTAS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing business ,
under the name and style of D.
A. AFFLECK GROCERY,
Defendant,
KENNETH BUTTE,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 6190

I

Brief of Appellant, Kenneth Butte

STATEMENT
Spero Saltas, thirty-year old son of plaintiff and
unmarried, died as B: result of an accident occurring about
1:30 p. m. on the 27th day of January, 1938, at the
intersection of Third Avenue and K Street, in Salt Lake
City, Utah. This action was prosecuted by deceased's
father to recover from appellant, Kenneth Butte, and his
employer, David A. Affleck, damages alleged to have
resulted from the negligence of the defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

The accident occurred near the center of the intersection of said named streets while deceased was proceeding north on K Street in a Ford V-8 automobile
driven by Gerald A. Franz, and appellant, Kenneth
Butte, was driving in a westerly direction on Third Avenue in a delivery truck owned by David A. Affleck.
To plaintiff's complaint, alleging the negligence of
appellant, an answer (Dft. Ab. 9) was filed denying
negligence and alleging that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of Gerald A. Franz in failing to yield the right of way to the automobile entering said intersection from the right, in driving at an excessive speed, in failing to keep his automobile under
proper control, and in failing to observe the traffic upon
the highway, and particularly the west-bound traffic
at said intersection.
Plaintiff had a number of children in addition to
deceased, including Paul, age twenty-one, working for
the Utah Copper at $3.00 a day; and Pete, age twenty,
working for the B. & G. Railroad at $3.63 a day. Plaintiff himself earned $4.23 a day for twenty-two days a
month, making total earnings to the family, not including deceased's wages, of about $13.00 a day. (Dft. Ab.
20, ?2-3) Deceased did not live at home all of the time,
living a number of months at Cyprus Hall. (Dft. Ab. 83)
How much, if anything, deceased contributed to plaintiff was very uncertain, as also was the question of the
cause of the accident.
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Upon the first trial a directed verdict (Pff. Ab. t 516) was returned in favor of the defendant, David A.
Affleck, for the reason that at the time of the accident.
the appellant, Kenneth Butte, was operating the automobile of his employer during his lunch period upon a frolic
of his own, in violation of his employer's instructions,
and not in furtherance of any business or purpose of his
employer, having driven the truck a distance of approximately ten blocks past the place where his employment
took him and being then headed to a place an additional
ten or tweh-e blocks further from any place where his
employment might call him.
The issues of linbility and damages were submitted
to the jury as against the appellant, Kenneth Butte, and
a unanimous verdict of $800.00 was returned by the
jury. (Dft. Ab. 27)
Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, (Pff. Ab.
16-18) claiming inadequate damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
A conditional order to increase the judgment to $2400.00
or grant a new trial was made by the court. (Dft. Ab.
28-9) Appellant filed a motion (Dft. Ab. 29) to set aside
such conditional order, which motion was denied, (Dft.
Ab. 30) and thereafter objected to a retrial of the action (Dft. Ab. 31) for the reason and upon the ground
that the order granting a new trial was improper and
that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction and abused
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

any discretion that might exist, which objection was
overruled. (Dft. Ab. 32-3)
Upon a second trial as against appellant, Kenneth
Butte only, wherein plaintiff premeditatively and improperly advised the jury of the existence of insurance,
a verdict of $3,061.00 was returned and judgment entered thereon. (Dft. Ab. 128) Appellant thereupon moved
(Dft. Ab. 128) to set aside the second verdict and reinstate
the first verdict of $800.00 which motion was denied, (Dft.
Ab. 131) and filed his motion for a new trial, (Dft. Ah.
129-130) which motion was also denied. (Dft. Ab. 131)

ERRORS RELIED UPON
The errors relied upon by appellant, Kenneth Butte,
may be classified and discussed under the following
general headings:

I. That the court was without jurisdiction, or in
any event was guilty of an abuse of discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial as against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, erroneously refused to set aside
the conditional order for a new trial, erroneously failed
to set aside the second verdict and reinstate the first verdict, and erroneously proceeded with the retrial of said
action. (Assignments of Error 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24)
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II. That upon the second trial, plaintiff's counsel
was guilty of prejudicial misconduct in deliberately conducting his examination of the jurors in such a manner
as to tell them, erroneously, that appellant, Kenneth
Butte, was insured, in cross-examining the witness, Norma Chamberlain concerning an alleged statement given
to "an adjuster for an insurance company," in making a
closing argument to the jury wherein he stated in effect
that an insurance adjuster or investigator was at the
scene of the accident the day it occurred or soon thereafter, which statement was not supported by any evidence, and then telling the jury that defendant's attorney spends all his time in the defense of this class
(insurance cases) of cases. The court erred in not discharging the jury as repeatedly requested by appellant's
counsel. (Assignments of Error 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5).
III. That the court erred in instructing the jury
on the law of the case. (Assignments of Error 7, 8, 9, 10,
11 and 12).
IV. That the court erred in refusing to instruct
the jury on appellant's theory and as requested by him.
(Assignments of Error 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18).
V. The court erred in erroneously permitting plaintiff's counsel to read from a deposition not offered or received in evidence. (Assignment of Error 6).
VI. Errors in rulings on admissibility of evidence,
(Assignments of Error 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33).
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VII.

Error in denying appellant's motion for a new

trial. (Assignment of Error 25).

ARGUMENT
The principal assignments of error relate
1.

To the granting of plaintiff's motion for a
new trial.

2.

To the refusal to discharge the jury at the
second trial on account of prejudicial and
deliberate misconduct of plaintiff's counsel.

3.

Improper instructions given to the jury and
proper instructions denied.

4.

Rulings on admissibility of evidence.

IMPROPER GRANTING OF NEW TRIAL
We particularly call attention to the fact that Section 104-40-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, setting forth
the grounds upon which a motion for a new trial rna y be
granted does not provide that a new trial may be
granted upon "INADEQUATE DAMAGES APPEARING TO
HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION
OR

PREJUDICE,"

which was the sole basis for the
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granting of the new trial herein; that no showing of
passion or prejudice was presented to the court and
the court merely was "INCLINED TO THINK * * '~ THAT
THE VERDICT WAS TOO LOW."
(Dft. Ab. 28). In view
of the extremely questionable case of liability, with
clear and positive evidence that Gerald A. Franz
was negligent. and unsatisfactory and purely speculative
evidence of damage, it cannot be said that the $800.00
unanimous verdict was such, without other showing, as
to disclose that it was the result of passion and prejudice.
"\Ye will not set forth the evidence in this brief as
even a cursory reading of it will clearly show that the
jury could well have found that the sole proximate canst:;
of the accident was the negligence of Gerald A. Franz,
the driver of the car in which deceased was riding, in
not looking to his right until he "was practically in the
center of the intersection" and "believed I could beat it
across the intersection." (Dft. Ab. 1?) We will only mention that said driver witness endeavored to have appellant's truck driven one hundred to one hundred ten feet
while the witness proceeded uphill "ten or twelve feet,"
(Dft. Ab. 18) at fifteen or twenty miles an hour, and
taking all of the testimony into consideration, ample
evidence was presented to show that had Gerald A.
Franz made any observation whatsoever he would have
seen the truck and could have stopped his automobile,
at the speed he said he was traveling, before ever reaching the south curbline of Third Avenue. These and other
facts disclosed by the evidence are mentioned for the
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sole purpose of advising the court that the jury was justified in taking into consideration the questionable
liability in arriving at a verdict of $800.00.
There is an even stronger justification for the
$800.00 verdict. Plaintiff endeavored to claim that this
thirty-year old son was his sole support. He testified,
"Spero lived in my house. That is the only boy I had
to help me. I was besides an old man, be sick, not do
anything. He do for me. He was the only one that helped.
I had four boys going to school, nobody else worked."
(Dft. Ab. 19) On cross-examination, plaintiff testified,
"I have worked in Bingham thirty years. I have worked
regularly for that time except in 1936. I am working
regularly now and worked regularly in 1937. My next
boy is Paul. He works for the Utah Copper." (Dft. Ab.
19) "He lives at home and helps me sometimes. Paul
earns $5.00 a day. My next boy is Pete. Pete earns $3.65
a day. I make $4.25 a day for twenty-two days a month.
The total income for myself and two boys is about
$13.00 a day, except when we are only working twentytwo days a month. Spero told me and my wife that he
would not get married until the other boys were old
enough to step in and help." (Dft. Ab. 20). The other
boys had stepped in more than a year prior to the date
of the accident and had taken over Spero's responsibility. At least, the jury could have so found. The facts
developed on the cross-examination of plaintiff showed
two things, first, a willingness on plaintiff's part to falsify the truth, and, second, that he was not financially
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dependent upon his deceased son. as he tried at first
to make appear. The jury may well have concluded that a
little more of the truth as developed upon the second trial
was the fact. Attention is called to the testimony of
plaintiff upon the second trial, when he finally admitted
that deceased had not lived at home as he had previously testified. but had lived for a number of months at
Cyprus Hall. (Dft. Ab. 83). It is interesting to note that
upon the second trial, plaintiff also admitted that Paul
paid rent charged to him by the Utah Copper. (Dft. Ab.
76-7?). There was no claim for special damages. Plaintiff was not impecunious or unemployed. Deceased was
not his sole support. The jury could have found that the
deceased, either while living away from home or at
home, was not financially supporting the plaintiff, but
that assistance of plaintiff had been taken over by Paul
and Pete by reason of Spero's having previously carried
his share of financial burden.·
Certainly in view of the questionable liability, the
facts testified to by plaintiff on the question of financial
assistance, including his willingness to extend the truth,
it was solely for the jury to determine the pecuniary
loss, if any, suffered by plaintiff. The court had some
kind of feeling or inclination that the verdict was too
low and permitted such feeling to overrule the verdict of
eight jurors, who had all the evidence before them, deliberated upon it, and concluded that plaintiff's pecuniary
loss under all the circumstances was $800.00.
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In considering the amount of this verdict, your attention is also called to the result upon the second trial.
The verdict was six to two, with two jurors holding out
for no cause of action, clearly showing questionable liability. The affidavits in support of appellant's motion
for a new trial after the second trial showed that one
juror of the six returning a verdict was in favor of an
$800.00 verdict, and even upon PLAINTIFF'S P R 0 0 F
of insurance, and a statement by one juror in the jury
room that he was in favor of sticking the insurance company, (Dft. Ah. 131) a verdict of only $3,061.00 was returned. (Dft. Ab. 128).
The situation is not unlike that in Hirabelli v. Daniels,
44 Utah 88, 138 Pac. 11'72, which was an action of assault
and battery, claiming $1,000.00 general damages, $50.00
medical expense, $18.00 loss of wages, and $500.00 punitive damages. Plaintiff's testimony was that besides receiving a rather severe injury, he lost $18.00 for one
week's work and paid $50.00 for a doctor's hill. We are
not concerned with the first trial of the case. Upon the
second trial, a verdict was returned for $35.00 actual
damages, consisting of $1.00 for pain and suffering,
$22.00 for medical expense, and $12.00 loss of wages.
There was conflicting testimony as to who was the
aggressor in provoking the fight. The court granted. a
third trial on the theory that the damages were inadequate and not in harmony with the evidence. A third
trial resulted in a verdict for $119.00. The defendant
then filed a motion to vacate the judgment and reinstate
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the $35.00 judgment, and, on the courfs refusal, to grant
a new trial. This motion was denied. A proper record of
the proceedings was preserved as in the instant case,
and defendant appealed. On appeal the judgment was
reversed with directions to reinstate the second judgment on the grounds that "as to the amount of the damages, the court could not set up his mere opinion or
judgment against that of the jury and grant a new
trial, because he may have thought the evidence apparently or fairly justified a larger verdict," and it could
not he said that "the jury in rendering the verdict on the
second trial * * * plainly disregarded or misapprehended
the instructions or the evidence or acted upon the influence of passion or prejudice." The Hirahelli case is
significant in its application to the instant case in that
(1) a proper record of the proceedings having been preserved in the instant case, the improper granting of a
new trial is reviewable, and (2) $i.OO general damages
for pain and suffering and $22.00 for reasonable medical
expenses, although $30.00 was actually paid, was held
not so inadequate as to warrant interference with the
verdict by the trial court, there being no fixed rule to
measure the amount of damages for the pain suffered,
and the question of damages is left to the sound discretion of the jury.
We present two matters for separate consideration,
namely (1) that the verdict of $800.00 in this case, like
in the Hirabelli case, was not so inadequate that the
trial court could say it was rendered under misappreSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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hension or disregard of the court's instructions, or under
the influence of passion or prejudice, and the court
usurped the functions of the jury and was guilty of an
abuse of discretion in granting plaintiff's motion; and
(2) the court's order granting a new trial was void, being
unauthorized by statute and an illegal invasion of the
province of the jury.

A.

MEASURE OF DAJ\IAGES IN DEATH CASES

An action for death differs materially from the
ordinary common law action for personal injuries in that
the measure of damages in each specific case is of necessity highly speculative, uncertain and problematical,
and the amount of damages is a question upon which
reasonable men may differ. Recovery was unknown to
the common law, and our statute, Section 104-3-11, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, similar to most death statutes, provides that "such damages may be given as under
all the circumstances of the case may be just." Some
states only allow as recoverable damages, loss of "financial services and assistance," disallowing loss of "society,
comfort, and protection," and "mental anguish, suffering,
and bereavement," as being too remote and speculative
and incapable of reduction to a monetary equivalent by
any accurate method or certain criteria. Other states
allow one or both of the last mentioned elements of
damage to be considered by the jury in rendering a verSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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diet, notwithstanding the highly speculative nature
thereof. Utah falls rather in a middle class, and the
measure of damage is loss of "financial services and
assistance" and loss measured by a pecuniary standard,
if any, of "society. comfort, and protection." Nothing,
however, is recoverable in Utah for "mental pain, suffering and bereavement," which is too remote and sentimental to he a proper element of damage under the
statute. Webb v. D. & R . G. W. R. Co., 7 Utah 17, 24
Pac. 616. And loss of "society, comfort and protection"
cannot he considered if the deceased was not living with.
the beneficiaries. White v. Shipley, 48 Utah 496, 160 Pac.
441, Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction, 57 Utah 566, 196
Pac. 556. Furthermore, any recovery must he for a
pecuniary and not a sentimental loss. As stated in White
v. Shipley, supra:
"The law awards damages for loss of comfort,
society and companionship only in a pecuniary
sense and not as solatium. * * * The loss must he
such that in contemplation of law it amounts to
the deprivation of some service, attention, or care
that has in it the element of pecuniary value."
And in Poole v. Southern Pacific Co., 7 Utah 303,
26 Pac. 654, it was said:
"As the testimony did not show that there
were heirs living who were pecuniarily injured by
his death, no recovery should be had, as in that
case, no one has sustained any pecuniary loss or
injury by his death."
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See also English v. Southern Pacific Company, 13 Utah
40?, 45 Pac. 4?. The measure of damages is not the p~cun
iary value of deceased's life, but rather the pecuniary
loss suffered by the plaintiff. This is peculiarly a question for the jury.
In an annotation In L. R. A. 1916C at page 810, it
is said that such damages
~·, are difficu It of precise proof and in a
measure are uncertain and problematical, and
what would be a proper compensation for the
pecuniary injuries suffered must always, on such
proof as can be made, be left to the sound judgment of the jury. In assessing the damages in such
cases, the jury are entitled to use their own experience and observation in connection with such
light as the evidence may reflect upon the subject,
and approximate as near as possible the pecuniary
loss, for the matter is necessarily largely left to
their sound sense, judg·ment, and discretion."
"~':

1'

On page 813, it is said:
"Where the question is presented to the court
as to whether or not it should interfere with the
jury's verdict, its solution does not depend upon
whether its judgment as to the amount of damages
awarded coincides with that of the jury, and the
mere fact that the court, had it been acting as a
jury in the particular case, would have assessed
the damages at a larger or smaller amount than
did the jury, in and of itself, is no ground for
interfering with the verdict of the jury. In other
words, the court will not impose upon the parties
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to the suit its judgment as to the proper amount
of damages to be assessed, in the place of that of
tht> jury, who are expressly authorized in that
regard by the statute:·
Where it can reasonably be found from the evidence
that deceased might not have continued to contribute
substantial sums of money to his next of kin, jury verdicts from all jurisdictions ranging from several hundred dollars down to nominal damages are held to be
binding upon the Court, the jury being entitled to take
into consideration the habits of the deceased in saving
his money, the size of the estate he had acquired, if any,
at the time of his death and that he might have acquired
but for his death, the age of his dependents and the
possibilities that they might soon be self-supporting,
the fact that most or all of deceased's earnings were used
up for his own expense and support, the fact that he
might have been thrown out of employment at any
time, and all of the other factors and uncertainties which
go to make up or determine what the actual financial
worth of deceased was to those suing for his death.
In Anderson v. Chicago, (Neb.) 52 N. W. 840, a
nominal verdict for $1.00 for the death of an unmarried
adult brakeman was upheld as being sufficient against
the contention that it was inadequate. The court said:
"* * -:: The damages are not to be estimated
by the value of the life lost, but such a sum as
the proof shows will compensate the next of kin
for the pecuniary injury which they have sustained
by such death. * -:: * Deceased, at the time of his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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death, was an unmarried adult. * * * There were
surviving ~·, ~·, ~·, eleven brothers and sisters, all of
whom but two had reached their majority, the
most of whom were married. The deceased was
addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, and
was careless in his work. * ~·: ·J: He was receiving
the sum of $45.00 per month. The testimony fails
to show that he saved his earnings, or that he had
been in the habit of making contributions for the
maintenance and support of any of his brothers
and sisters. -:: -;, * Under the proof they were warranted in inferring that the next of kin were not
pecuniarily injured by the death of the intestate;
hence plaintiff was only entitled to recover nominal damages."
Nebraska, like Utah, allows the jury to consider loss of
society and companionship in assessing the damage. Ensor
v. Compton, (Neb.) 194 N. W. 458.
In Barksdale v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., (S. C.) 56
S. E. 906, a verdict for $1,000.00 for the death of an engineer, was held not inadequate. South Carolina goes even
further than Utah and most states, and permits the jury
in assessing the damages to consider not only loss of
society and companionship, but also mental anguish and
suffering. Birchman v. Southern R. R., (S. Car.) 54 S. E.
553.
In Russell v. Taglialavore et al, (La.) 153 So. 44, a
$500.00 verdict was held not inadequate where decedent
left no children. The court said:
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"Each case must depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. In the present
case, we cannot conceive that plaintiff has suffered damages for the negligent killing of his
wife beyond a nominal amount. We think $500.00
sufficient."
Louisiana, like South Carolina, permits consideration of
mental anguish and suffering of the heirs, and goes
even further than South Carolina, allowing physical suffering of deceased. Aymond v. JVestern Union Telegraph
Co., {La.) 91 So. 671, and Reed v. Warren, (La.) 132 So. 250.
In Foglia v. Pittsburgh, (Penn.} 179 Atl. 871, a verdict for $500.00 was held to be adequate for the death
of a boy who expected to be a laborer. The funeral expenses amounted to $265.50. Pennsylvania like Utah,
allows recovery for loss of society. Cokley v. Northern
Penn. R. Co., (Pa.} 5 Clark 444.
In Leahy v. Davis, (Mo.) 25 S. W. 941, a verdict of
$175.00 for the death of a seventeen year old boy employed as a teamster was held to be not so inadequate
as to warrant a new trial where the funeral expenses
amounted to $55.00 less than the total amount of the
verdict. We quote from the case:

"* * * A new ~rial will not be granted on
the sole ground of smallness of damages * * *
There can be no invariable rule in a case like this.
* * * When so much is left to the discretion and
experience of the jury, the court should be very
cautious in disturbing their ,judgment."
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At the time of this decision, Missouri, like Utah, permitted
the jury to consider loss of society and association.
In Cuniffe's Exec. v. Johnson, (Ky.) 132 S. W. (2d)
4?, a verdict of $500.00 was held not so inadequate as to
be said to be the result of passion, prejudice, or mistake,
where the action was brought by a sister and the deceased had a life expectancy of 16.4 years and earned
an average of $200.00 per month. The court pointed out
that damages in a death case are not so easily ascertainable as in a personal injury case, saying:
"Necessarily, such damages are speculative.
They depend on many unpredictable factors such
as the length of time the decedent would have
lived but for the accident, the probable condition
of his health thereafter and his ability to work,
retention of his employment, amount of his earnings, and amoun.t saved out of his earnings. Many
contingencies must be considered, and the jury
has a wide field to explore in reaching its verdict.
In a case of this kind it is impossible to say with
any reasonable degree of certainty what the
injury to the estate was. The answer rests on
probabilities, and, at best, is a matter of conjecture. It may have been much or little, according to the sequence of events, if the decedent had
not been killed, which are unforeseeable."
In Burke v. Arcata & ~f. R. R. Co., (Cal.) 5? Pac.
1065, suit was brought by a sister and two brothers, all
adults, for the death of the deceased, who was thirty-four
years old, in good health, a competent and reliable locoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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motive engineer, unmarried and boarding with one of his
brothers immediately before the accident. and on friendly terms with the plaintiffs. It was held reversible error
to not submit a requested instruction limiting the damages
to a nominal sum. The court among other things said:
"In this country the ruling is nearly unanimous that the statute gives a cause of action, and,
if no damages are proven, nominal damages only
can be recovered. * * *Let us consider upon what
a sea of uncertainty the jury must embark. (1)
\Yould the deceased have had the health to work
and accumulate, and would he have done so? He
never has saved anything, and it does not appear
that he could. (2) May he not have married, and
have had children of his own, who would inherit?
(3) ~fight he not by will have disinherited the
plaintiffs. And (4) might he not have outlived
them? The majority of men die without much
property. \Vhether the deceased would have succeeded in accumulating, and, if he had been successful, would have left it to plaintiffs, is matter
of pure speculation. Such a guess as to probabilities is not, according to settled rules and maxims
of the law, proper ground for the award of damages. I see no reason why this class of cases should
constitute an exception."
In Vanek v. Chicago G. JV. R. Co., 252 Fed. 871,
a verdict of $1.00 was upheld. The court said:
"The deceased was of middle age, in robust
health, in full possession of his sight and hearing. * * * It is the settled rule of the Federal
Courts that disputed questions of fact are to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

be found by the jury, and such findings will
not be disturbed by the court unless it was
the result of passion, prejudice, or some manifest misconduct. It cannot be said that this
verdict of $1.00 under the circumstances of this
case, indicates either passion, prejudice, or misconduct on the part of the jury. * * * The evidence would warrant a much larger verdict beyond a doubt. Indeed, it may be said that had
the assessment been made by the court the recovery would have been considerably in excess
of the sum awarded by the jury. But the question of damages was for the jury. * * * The
verdict should not be disturbed, even though the
court may regard it as inadequate unless something is shown which indicates passion, prejudice,
or corrupt motive, or that they made an important and manifest mistake."

In DeLuna v. Union Railway Co. of New York City,
114 N. Y. S. 893, a verdict of $189.?5, the exact amount
of the funeral expenses, was ordered reinstated as not
being inadequate. Deceased was thirty-two years of age,
unmarried, leaving a brother and two married sisters.
She had been employed as a seamstress at $9.00 a week,
and was assistant to the foreman and in line for promotion. She lived with plaintiff and plaintiff's husband
and paid for her board. The court said that the damages
are "limited to such a sum as the jury terms to be fair
and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries sustained by the persons for whose benefit the action is
brought." The court further went on to say:
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"Recognizing the general prospective and indefinite character of these damages and the impossibility of a basis for accurate estimate it
allows a jury to give what they shall deem a
just compensation * * * the damages to the next
of kin in that respect are necessarily indefinite,
prospective, and contingent. They cannot be
proved even with an approach to accuracy, and
yet they are to be estimated and awarded, for the
statute has so commanded. * * * Human lives
are not all of the same value to survivors."
In Swanton v. King, '72 App. Div. 5'78, '76 N. Y. S.
528, a $600.00 verdict was held not inadequate as damages for the death of an unmarried man twenty-two
years old, where the evidence showed that for twelve
months prior to his death, while living with his father
and mother, he had worked steadily for $9.00 per week,
which he brought home to his mother, his next of kin
being his father, mother, sister, and four brothers.
In Rlwads v. Chicago & A. R. Co., (Ill.) 81 N. E.
3'71, a verdict of $1.00 for the death of a lawyer was
held to be not inadequate. The deceased was forty-eight
years old, had an earning capacity of $10,000.00 per
year, was unmarried and left surviving him a brother
and three sisters.
In Chesapeake Ohio & S. W. R. Co. v. Higgins,
(Tenn.) 4 S. W. 4'7, deceased was a capable, skillful, and
experienced locomotive engineer. A suit brought by his
wife resulted in a verdict of $500.00. Upon motion a
new trial was granted resulting in a $5,000.00 verdict.
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On appeal the Supreme Court set aside the latter judgment and entered judgment for $500.00, the original
verdict, saying: "The verdict of the jury for $500.00 does
not evince passion, prejudice, or corruption authorizing
the court to set it aside."
In Ratushny v. Punch et al, (Conn.) 138 Atl. 220,
it was held that the trial court erred in setting aside a
$1000.00 verdict for the death of a forty-nine year old
foreman earning $42.00 per week where there was no
passion or prejudice of the jury shown. The deceased
was sober and industrious, in good bodily health, employed at $42.00 per week at Chase Metal works, where
he had been for twenty years and had lost no time in
that period. He was an expert drawer and for ten years
had been subforeman, and during the last year had
earned $2100.00 and his life expectancy was 21.95 years.
The court said:
"The question * ~" ~" is not whether this court
or the trial court would have come to the same
conclusion as the jury reached, but whether the
jury was within its proper province * ~" ~". Such
problems are peculiarly appropriate for a jury's
deliberation. * 'i: * It is not to be overlooked that
the pecuniary injuries resulting ~" ~" ~" are difficult
of precise proof and in a measure are uncertain
and problematical. In assessing damages in such
cases, the jury are entitled to use their own experience and observation in connection with such
light as the evidence may reflect upon the subJect
and approximate as near as possible the pecuniary
loss, for the matter is necessarily largely left to
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their sound sense, judgment and discretion. There
was no certainty of future earnings. of work. of
health, or even life, and this was a fact to be
considered. All these uncertainities made the ques,.
tion.
In the following cases the verdicts indicated were
all held not inadequate: Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co.
v. JVilliams, (Ky.) 200 S. W. 451, $1,000.00 for the death
of a bus driver; JVilkin's Admin. v. Hopkins, (Ky.) 128
S. W. (2d) 7"!2, $500.00 for the death of an elderly man
earning $5.94 a day and with a life expectancy o( ?.4
years; 1llulchahey v. JVashburn Car Wheel Co., (Mass.)
14 N. E. 106, $1.00 for the death of a machinist; Price v.
Glynea & C. Coal & Brick Co., 85 L. J. K. B. N. S. (Eng.)
12?8-C. A., 225 pounds for the death of a miner, leaving surviving him a widow and a twenty-eight year
old daughter; Smith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (S.
Dak.) 62 N. W. 96?, $1.00 for an adult child where the
father was left surviving; Powell v. Canadian P. R. Co.,
? Sask. L. R. 43, $1,000.00 for a car repairman, thirty-six
years of age, unmarried, and earning $?5.00 per month,
Jeaving surviving his mother, who was seventy-one years
and receiving about ten shillings a week from deceased;
Howard v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 40 Fed. 195, $1.00
for a thirty-seven year old trackman on a railroad, leaving surviving three brothers and two sisters, no wife,
children, or parents; Haley v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 'Z' Baxt.
(Tenn.) 239, $5.00; Such v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co.,
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hility was questionable; Schnable v. Providence Public
Market, (R. I.) 53 Atl. 634, $750.00 for a five year old
hoy; Kinser v. Soap Creek Coal Co., (Iowa) 51 N. W. 1151,
$300.00 for a young man twenty years of age, strong,
healthy, intelligent, industrious, and saving; Snyder v.
Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., (Mich.) 91 N. W. 643, $250.00
for a twelve year old hoy attending school and in addi·
tion assisting at home; Gubbitosi v. Rothschilds, 78 N. Y.
S. 286, $200.00 for a six year old hoy; Overholt v. Vieths,
(Mo.) 6 S. W. 74, $10.00; Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch,
(Ind.) 153 N. E. 507, $1.00; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.
1-Veber, (Kan.) 6 Pac. 877, nominal damages; Hartsell v.
Harris, (N. C.) 178 S. E. 120, $1,000.00 for a twenty-four
year old woman employed in a hosiery mill and earning
$15.00 per week; Purnell v. R. Co., (N. C.) 130 S. E. 313,
$1,000.00 for a ten year old hoy of bright mind, good
health, habits and character, and a fine physique.
In Webb v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., 7 Utah 17, 24 Pac.
616, it was said:
"The damages, the pecuniary injury in cases
under this statute, cannot he proved with even an
approach to accuracy, and yet they are to he
estimated and awarded, for the statute has so
commanded and the jury is to give such damages
as may he just under all the circumstances."
In the instant case, plaintiff's pecuniary loss on
account of the death of his son is purely speculative for
the following reasons:
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(a) Deceased was unmarried and left no family
of his own.
(h) Plaintiff admitted his deceased son had agreed
to assist him only until the next older boys were working, and such boys had been working for nearly a year,
and, with himself, were earning between $13.00 and
$15.00 per day. It is not likely this one son would
continue to contribute to the support of his family indefinitely when other members of the family had taken
over the burden.
(c) Deceased had indicated he would not get married until the other boys were old enough to step in and
help, and as they were then helping, the assumption
would he that deceased would have married and acquired responsibilities of his own.
(d) Plaintiff had other childen living with and
aiding him, who would more or less take the place of the
son lost through the accident.
(e) Deceased had been living away from home
at Cyprus Hall for a number of months.
(f) Plaintiff did not by his complaint assert any
claim for special damages.
(g) Up to the time of his death, deceased had not
acquired an estate, and the probabilities were that he
never would have acquired anything substantial.
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(h) Living and other expenses of deceased would
probably have taken substantially all his future earnings.
(i) How long deceased would have lived or been
employed or helped plaintiff would be pure speculation.
(j) Plaintiff was not entitled to recover anything
for solace to his feelings, sorrow or other losses not

measurable in money.
(k) Because of plaintiff's apparent willingness to
falsify the truth on certain matters relating to damage,
the jurors may have been convinced that plaintiff was
suffering mostly from an itching palm.
Under these circumstances, the jury evidently concluded that the pecuniary loss suffered by plaintiff was
not substantial. Under our practice, particularly where
a plaintiff demands a trial by jury, he submits all questions of fact, including the question of damage to the
sound judgment and discretion of the jury, and is bound
by the verdict returned by it. He is not entitled to have
that verdict set aside merely because he is dissatisfied
with the amount or the court has a feeling it is not
enough. The matter of damages in this case was fairly
presented to the jury under proper instructions, not objected to by defendant, and their unanimous verdict
was $800.00. Much smaller amounts have been held not
inadequate. There was absolutely no showing of dis·
regard or misapprehension of the instructions given by
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the court or that the jurors acted under the influence
of passion or prejudice. The evidence sustained the verdict, and the court was not entitled to set up its opinion
or judgment against that of the jury, merely because he
thought the verdict small or that the evidence may have
justified a larger verdict. As was done in the Hirabelli
case, the verdict rendered on the first trial should be
reinstated.

B.

THE ORDER MADE BY THE COURT WAS VOID

Let us now consider the validity or invalidity of the
order as made by the court. We have pointed out that
the Utah Statutes make no provision for the granting
of a new trial upon "inadequate damages," and although
Section 104-40-7 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides,
"A verdict of jury may also be vacated and a new trial
granted by the court * * * when there has been a plain
disregard by the jury of the instructions of the Court,
or the evidence in the case, as to satisfy the court that
the verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of
such instructions or under the influence of passion or
prejudice." The order of the trial court was not and
could not he made under this statute because:
(1) There was no showing that there had been a
plain disregard by the jury of the instructions of the
court or the evidence in the case as to show the verdict
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was rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice,
and
(2) The court ordered the verdict increased to
$2400.00 or a new trial granted, thus setting up its own
verdict in place of the jury's.

This is not the same as an order reducing an excessive verdict to a lower figure, a practice sometimes indulged in, because in such case the jury has already
found the reduced sum owing and more, but when the
verdict is increased by the court the jury has never
rendered a verdict against the defendant for such an
amount. The order as made required defendant to pay
$2400.00 or submit to a new trial. In effect, the court
said: "You must find more than $2400.00 damage." We
have cited numerous cases holding damages much less
than $800.00, and even nominal damages, as not being
inadequate. The court's action was most certainly an
unlawful usurpation of the province of the jury and interference with the right of trial by jury and was void.
We submit for separate consideration:
(1)

That the verdict of $800.00 plus costs in this

case was not so inadequate that the court could say
it was rendered under a misapprehension or disregard
of the court's instructions or under the influence of passion or prejudice, and
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(2) The court's order granting a new trial was void,
being unauthorized by statute. and an illegal invasion of
the province of the jury.

EXISTENCE OF INSURANCE INDEMNIFICATION
This court is not concerned as to whether appellant,
Kenneth Butte, is, or is not insured, hut under the form of
policy issued in this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, under similar facts, has held that insurance protection is not extended to the driver of the car. See Laroche v.
Farm Bureau Mutual Auto Ins. Co. (Penn.) 7 Atl. (2d)
361. We mention this only because if the question of insurance influenced the jury, it may well be that Kenneth Butte will suffer the consequences of a verdict
resulting from a grossly unfair trial. Whether Kenneth
Butte or an insurance company pays a verdict, if such
verdict results from improper evidence or the injection
of improper elements into,a case, there has been a failure
in the administration of justice.
A reference to Assignments of Error 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
and the record in the transcript and the abstract shows
a deliberate intention prior to the examination of the
jurors to "tell" the jury of the existence of liability
insurance. (Dft. Ab. 34-35) Then followed a systematic
and conscientious fulfillment of that intention in questioning each and every one of the fourteen jurors concerning insurance, after the court by a proper examinaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion had substantially eliminated the possibility of any
of the jurors, with one exception, having any connection with an insurance company. (Dft. Ab. 35-41).
Appellant's counsel then clearly presented to the
court the deliberately planned and systematically car..
ried out purpose of plaintiff's counsel and moved for
a discharge of the jury, (Dft. Ab. 42-44), but counsel
for plaintiff was not satisfied that the jury fully understood his wishes, and during the trial in examining Norma
Chamberlain, a witness for defendant (Dft. Ab. 96-97),
he asked her if she "gave a statement to a man by the
name of Parkinson, who is an adjuster of an insurance
company?" The record clearly shows that this was not
done in good faith for the purpose of eliciting any information, because when such statement was offered
to counsel, he declined to use it, and after the damage
was done in asking the question, he withdrew the question.
In conducting his examination of the jurors and the
question asked Norma Chamberlain, counsel was guilty
of prejudicial and deliberate misconduct, but this still
did not satisfy him for he then went entirely outside
the record in his closing argument to the jury and stated,
"that on the day of the accident or soon thereafter an
investigator or adjuster was out at the scene of the accident," (Dft. Ab. 123-124) and still not being satisfied, he
endeavored to tell the jury that the appellant was being
defended by an insurance company through its counsel,
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by stating "that the defendant secured an attorney who
spends all his time in the defense of this class of ca~es."
(Dft. Ah. 123).
In addition to moving for a discharge of the jury
at the close of the examination of the jury and before
the introduction of evidence (Dft. Ab. 42), appellant
renewed such motion before the case was submitted to
the jury (Dft. Ah. 111). Appellant also presented affidavits in support of his motion for a new trial, showing
that the question of insurance has been discussed in the
jury room and that one of the jurors had stated he was
in favor of ••sticking an insurance company." These
affidavits are a part of the record. (Dft. Ab. 131)

AUTHORITIES
In presenting this matter, we are fully conscious of
the rule in this jurisdiction and others that when the
defendant has liability insurance jurors may be examined on voir dire appropriately in good faith concerning their connection with insurance companies, for the
purpose of determining their possible prejudice against
plaintiff's cause. Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 Pac.
(2d) 224. This is a qualified privilege, however, and
counsel must proceed in the utmost good faith and for
the sole purpose of determining the bias or prejudice of
jurors, and any attempt to bring insurance before the
jury to impress upon them the fact that defendant is
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indemnified is misconduct and grounds for a new trial
or reversa I on a Ppeal . AFTER THE JURY IS QUALIFIED
AND THE CASE PROCEEDS TO TRIAL, THERE IS THEN
ABSOLUTELY NO CAUSE FOR INJECTION OF "INSURANCE"
JNTO THE CASE AND ANY REFERENCE THERETO DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY IS CAUSE FOR A MISTRIAL,

and this

applies equally to questions and answers of witnesses
or to argument and suggestion in the presence of the
jury. There are exceptions, yes, but these exceptions are
well defined and may be summarized as follows:
(1) where the fact is a necessary incident to some material and proper fact in the case (as in Reid v. Owens'
(Utah) 93 Pac. (2d) 680, where the reference to insurance was a part of an admission of liability or responsibility which was proved, and perhaps provable only
by the admissions of the defendant, W. F. Owens, and
the allusion to insurance was so freighted with the admission that it could not be separated.); (2) if the interest of a witness can only be shown by such reference
(as where an agent or doctor employed by the insurance
company is called as a witness); (3) where the matter
comes out through inadvertence as by an unintentional
and unresponsive answer. (This can hardly be classified
as an exception, but the courts sometimes hold a mistrial will not be granted if the trial court promptly
handles the situation by instruction or otherwise and it
appears there was no prejudice.); (4) where the insurance
company is a party to the suit. Otherwise any matter
suggestive of insurance injected into the case during the
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r-

trial is considered misconduct, as depriving the defendant
of a fair trial, and constitutes reversible error.

A.

EXAMINATION OF JURORS

It is significant that defendant in examining the
prospective jurors on voir dire did not pursue a method
least suggestive of insurance. In Balle v. Smith, this
court suggested a procedure sufficient for any proper
purpose. It said:
..The examination must be in good faith
and precaution taken to ask the questions in such
manner as will not convey the impression that
the defendant is in fact insured. It would be misconduct on the part of counsel for plaintiff in
such actions to so frame his questions that they go
beyond what is reasonably necessary to serve the
legitimate purpose of eliciting the fact he is entitled to adduce in order to secure a jury free
from bias and prejudice. Daniel v. Asbill, 9?
Cal App. ?31, 2?6 P. 149. The Supreme Court
of Michigan in Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich.
18?, 236 N. W. 222, 224, has suggested a method
of conducting the examination of jurors relative
to the matter of insurance which we approve as
sufficient and proper to give plaintiff the information to which he is entitled and at the same time
protect defendant from prejudice. Such a method
of examination might well be followed by counsel
seeking to elicit such information, or by the trial
judge. It is there said:
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•• 'We also might suggest to the trial judges
who so frequently examine the jury on the voir
dire that they might make a brief statement calling attention to the fact that some automobile
drivers do, and others do not, carry insurance;
that under no circumstances should it make any
difference whatever as to the outcome of the case
whether such insurance is carried or not; that
the judge asks the question about to be put in
every negligence case, and that he does not know,
nor does the asking of the question signify,
whether defendant carried insurance; that the law
does not permit any further reference to be made
to the subject during the trial of the case, but
that the plaintiff has a right to know whether
any of the members of the jury are officers, employees, or stockholders in any insurance company
or members of any mutual insurance company.
If, after asking the question, the answer is in the
affirmative, further questions may follow and
challenges made, if desired. If it is in the negative, the question is disposed of with finality.
Such an action on the part of the trial judges
should result in the further exclusion of all reference to insurance under penalty of a reversal of
the case, should counsel persist in again purposely
referring to it. * * * As a rule, there is no necessity of naming an insurance company.',
Other courts have prescribed similar procedure. In
Bergendahl v. Rabeler, (S. Ct. of Neb.) 268 N. W. 459,
where a judgment was reversed because of improper
examination of jurors, it was said:
"To say that such interrogation in this case
was made to secure information for use in the
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exercise of challenges is not worthy of belief.
To allow such an interrogation in all cases because it might in some cases have a legitimate use
is to allow the unscrupulous and unethical to use
it under a false guise for a purpose that no ethical
lawyer would desire to attain. The pernicious,
unethical purpose for which an unrestricted right
to such an interrogation on voir dire may be used
is such that restriction is necessary to an attainment of a proper consideration of issues in actions
tried to juries. To deny such a right entirely would
work far less perversion of proper verdicts than
does its unrestricted use.
'"We feel that if such an interrogation is made
at all, it should only be made when its legitimate
purpose cannot be otherwise attained. We therefore hold that, upon the voir dire examination of
jurors in a trial to a jury of an action for damages
alleged to have arisen from negligence, counsel
should scrupulously avoid any act, statement or
question of such a nature as will reasonably
inform the jury as to whether or not the defendant
is indemnified by one not a party to the action
against having to pay any verdict the jury may
render against him. * * * To ask of the juror
whether or not he is an agent of or ,gfockholder
in any corporation and, if he says he is either, lo
make inquiry of him as to the kind of corporation
lo which he bears such relation will usually give
all information needed without use of the word
'insurance.' This method of inquiry was suggested
in Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc., supra."
In Avery v. Collins, (Miss.) 157 S. 695, it was said:
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"The proper means of ascertaining the qualifications of a tendered juror in respect to his insurance connections is to ask him what business
he is engaged in and if the answer is, for instance,
that he is a farmer, then the further precautionary question may be put to him whether he had
any other business or business connections, and,
if he answers that he has not, that usually ought
to end the privilege so far as inquiry into his
insurance connections are concerned."
To the same effect see Holman v. Cole, (Mich.) 218
N. W. 795.
Oklahoma prescribes a similar procedure stated
in Safeway Cab Service Company v. Miner, 70 Pac. (2d)
76 at page 78.
In the instant case, plaintiff's counsel in examining each and every juror, even the widow of Tommy
Williams, County Building elevator operator, and after
learning the business and business connections of each
juror and the improbability of their having any connection with the Seattle insurance company, asked them
if they were stockholders, officers or employees of the
Northwest Casualty Company of Seattle, Washington.
Such examination was made of housewives, a musician,
a tailor, a contractor, a store clerk, a food products district manager, and others solely for the purpose of emphasizing the insurance question. (Dft. Ab. 33-44, Dft.
Tr. 19-35).
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In Alexiou v. Nockas, (Wash.) 17 Pac. (2d) 911, it
was said:
"(14) The examination of the jurors by respondent's counsel constituted reversible error.
'Ve cannot countenance such inappreciation of the
ethics as counsel manifested.· The purpose of his
question was, patently, to inform the jury that
the loss would fall upon an insurance company
instead of the appellant."
In .~.Hiller v. Kooker, (Iowa) 224 N. W. 46, similar
procedure was held to be reversible error when the
prospective jurors consisted largely of farmers and farm
wives. The court said that "the references to the matter
of liability insurance were prejudicial misconduct, not
cured by the plaintiff's disclaimers or the court's instructions."
In Ryan v. Simeons, (Iowa) 229 N. W. 667, where
eight of the jurors were farmers and had been all of
their lives, three were housewives, one of which was
retired and another the wife of a common laborer, in
reversing the judgment, the court said:
"It would not be fair to learned and distinguished counsel who tried the case for the
plaintiff to assume that they really suspected
that the farm and laboring men who were being
examined on voir dire were stockholders in the
Great Western Casualty Company of Ft. Scott,
Kansas, or any other or similar organization."
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In Purcell v. Degenhardt, 202 Ill. App. 611, it was
held that there was no occasion to ask a talesman and a
groceryman if they were interested in any insuran_ce or
casualty company doing liability business.
Reference to insurance after the jury is qualified
and during the course of the trial is strongly indicative of
counsel's bad faith in examining the jurors on voir dire.
In Helton v. Prater's Admin., (Ky.) 114 S. W. (2d)
1120, where the examination of the jurors had been
similar to that in the instant case and counsel made
reference to insurance on his own car in his closing
argument, in reversing the judgment the court said:
"We seriously question the sufficiency of
the showing made by plaintiff's attorney to show
his good faith and to authorize the interrogation
of the jurors on the question of insurance, but
when in his closing argument to the jury he made
the uncalled-for and unnecessary statement concerning insurance, the real purpose of the voir
dire examination was disclosed. * * * The defendant moved to discharge the jury and continue the
case, and his motion should have been sustained.
On another trial, all references to insurance should
scrupulously be kept from the jury and interrogation of prospective jurors on voir dire concerning insurance should not be permitted unless
a satisfactory showing is made that one or more
of the jurors maybe connected with or interested
in the company in which the defendant was insured, thus furnishing some reasonable basis for
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the interrogator's claim of good faith. * * * Usually
a method of inquiry can be adopted which will
elicit the information sought without conveying
to the jury the information that defendant carried
insurance."
In Volkmann v. Brosm.an, 129 Ill. App. 182, it was
said that the purpose of the voir dire examination suggesting insurance "was made obvious in the course of
the trial."
See also Bergendahl v. Rabeler, (Neb.) supra, and
Harris v. Elliot (Okla.) 61 Pac. (2d) 1089.
In the following cases, misconduct of counsel on
voir dire examination, either alone, or coupled with subsequent misconduct required a reversal, the error being
incurable by instruction to the jury.

Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. Morrison, (Ariz.) 224
Pac. 822;
Arnold v. California Portland Cement Co., (Cal.)
183 Pac. 171;
Pickwick Stage Lines Inc. v. Edwards, (10th
C. C. A.) 64 Fed. (2d) 758;
Stewart v. Brune, (8th C. C. A.) 179 Fed. 350;
Eckhart & Swan Milling Co. v. Schaefer's Admin.,
101 Ill App. 500;
G. A. Fuller Co. v. Darragh, 101 Ill. App. 664;
Volkmann v. Brossman, 129 Ill. App. 182;
Crowley v. Stresenreuter, 174 Ill. App. 538;
Purcell v. Degenhardt, 202 Ill. App. 611;
Bunch v. Abbott, 256 Ill. App. 33;
Mithen v. jeffrey, (Ill.) 102 N. E. 778;
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Martin v. Lilley, (Ind.) 121 N. E. 443;
Ryan v. Simeons, (Iowa) 229 N. W. 66'7;
Miller v. Kooker, (Iowa) 224 N. W. 46;
W. G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Thompson's Admin.,
(Ky.) 162 S. W. 1139;
Helton v. Prater's Admin. (Ky.) 114 S. W. (2d.)
1120;
]anse v. Haywood, (Mich.) 259 N. W. 34'7;
Holman v. Cole, (Mich.) 218 N. W. '795;
Pettit v. Goetz Sales Co., (Mo.) 281 S. W. 9'73;
Chambers v. Kennedy, (Mo.) 2'74 S. W. '726;
Wilson v. Thurston, (Mont.) 26'7 Pac. 801;
Bergendahl v. Rabeler, (Neb.) 268 N. W. 459;
Lassig v. Barsky, 8'7 N. Y. S. 425;
Rothenberg v. Collins, 146 N.Y. S. '762;
Lipshutz v. Ross, 84 N. Y. S. 632;
Chernick v. Independent American Ice Cream Co.,
121 N. Y. S. 352;
Gebo v. Findlay, 11 N. Y. S. 950;
Hoge v. Soissions, (Ohio) 192 N. E. 860;
Berry v. Park, (Okla.) 90 Pac. (2d) 425;
Harris v. Elliott, (Okla.) 61 Pac. (2d) 1089;
Alexiou v. Nockas, (Wash.) 1'7 Pac. (2d) 911;
Lucchesi v. Reynolds, (Wash.) 216 Pac. 12;
Adams v. The Cline Ice Cream Co., (W. Va.) 131
S. E. 86'7.
When the case of Balle v. Smith was before this
court, it is apparent a warning was issued to trial counsel to proceed fairly and cautiously in ascertaining the
possible bias of jurors. A suggestive procedure was outlined. The case was one of first impression and, undoubtedly, the court hesitated under the circumstances to say
the conduct was deliberate. Counsel have generally
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heeded these words of caution, but certainly the time
and circumstances shown by the record in this case
justify more than another caution, in fact, a condemnation of inexcusable and deliberate misconduct.
Cases should be tried upon facts and the law applicable, not upon an appeal to bias, prejudice, or ignorance.
A small verdict on the first trial and two jurors holding
out for no cause of action on the second trial justify a
conclusion that the jurors were not satisfied either on
the question of liability or damages. If prejudicial misconduct was ever resorted to in an effort to secure an
unjustified verdict, it is disclosed by the record in this
case.

B.

QUESTIONING WITNESSES

Wholly aside from any issue in the case, counsel
boldly asked the witness, Norma Chamberlain, if she
"gave a statement to a man by the name of Parkinson,
who is an adjuster for an insurance company?" Thi~
was misconduct sufficient in and of itself to require
a reversal of the judgment. (Dft. Ab. 96)
Attention is here called to the case of Berry v. Park,
(Okla.) 90 Pac. (2d) 425, in which the matter came up on
voir dire examination of the jurors rather than during
the course of the trial, but the language used is so
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much like that in the instant case, we feel it merits
comment here. During such examination, the following
question was asked: "Do you know Mr. Crowe, the
adjuster for Mr. Berry, setting over there, the man from
Oklahoma City?" In reversing the judgment, the court
had this to say:
"The word 'adjuster' has been so closely associated with the term 'insurance' in the investigation and trial or settlement of claims arising out
of automobile accidents during recent years that
in common parlance or usage and in the minds of
the public generally it has become synonymous
with or an abbreviated way of referring to an
'insurance adjuster.' * ~~ ~~ Because of this current
common knowledge, the slightest intimation under
certain circumstances is all that is necessary to
transform a suspicion into an actual belief or conviction in the minds of present day jurors that a
defendant is insured. For the foregoing reasons,
we cannot bring ourselves to the conclusion that
counsels' use of the word in question is 'too remote
and too far-fetched to attribute to it' any 'pernicious effect' as we said of the use of the same word in
Teeters v. Frost, 145 Okl. 2?3, 292 P. 356, 361, ?1
A. L. R. 1?9. * * * In his brief, said counsel argues
that his use of the term 'adjuster' in referring to
Mr. Crowe effected no further implications than
that Crowe was an 'agent' for the defendant. In
our opinion such an assertion merely begs the question and makes one wonder why then did counsel
not use the word 'agent' instead of a term as suggestive as 'adjuster.' * * ~~ We hold that the question propounded to the jury by the plaintiff's counsel on voir dire examination, which constitutes the
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error discussed in the defendant's first proposition, was prejudicial and ground for reversal.
In Consolidated Motors Inc. v. Ketcham, (Ariz.) 66
Pac. (2d) 246, on cross examination of one of the defendants, plaintiff's counsel concerning a statement, asked,
"Who did you make it to?" The answer, "A lawyer for
the insurance company, at that time, Charlie Young." In
reversing the case, the court said:

"It will he seen that the rule laid down by
us is, that unless it appears that the plaintiff was
entirely without blame in creating the situation
which caused the reference to the question of insurance, we have always reversed the case whenever the matter was in any way brought to the attention of the jury, regardless of whether it came
through a witness for plaintiff or defendant, or
upon direct or cross-examination. It is not sufficient that plaintiff did not mean to bring out the
prohibited matter, hut he must mean not to.
"It is evident from the cross-examination,
which referred to a specific signed statement
made at a certain time, that counsel for plaintiff
had in mind one particular statement of which
he had knowledge. We are of the opinion that
since this must have been true, it was the duty
of counsel, even if the statement itself might be
admissible for any purpose, to so carefully guard
the manner in which it was introduced as to, if
possible, avoid any reference to the insurance
company. This he might easily have done by issuing a subpoena duces tecum to the person to whom
he knew it was made, and then, since it was a
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signed and written statement, identifying it
through the testimony of the defendant, and if
it in any particular thereof was admissible, offering or using it in evidence. He chose not to do
this but went into the matter in such a manner
that he should have known it was hut natural for
the question of insurance to come out during the
cross-examination. * * * In view of what we have
said as to the highly prejudicial effect of allowing a jury even to surmise from statements made
during the trial that hack of the nominal defendants there stands an insurance company, and the
great care which a plaintiff must use to see
that the matter does not come into the case through
any fault of his, we are of the opinion that the
case must be reversed for a new trial on this
ground, regardless of the other assignments of
error."

Bluebar Taxi Cab & Transfer Company v. Hudspeth,
216 Pac. 246, and Fike v. Grant, 8 Pac. (2d) 242, both from
the State of Arizona, are to the same effect.
Ward et al v. Haralson et al, (Ark.) 120 S. W. (2d)
322;
"(5) There is one other matter we feel constrained to mention which would call for a re·
versal of the judgment even though the record
was otherwise free from error. In the cross-examination of appellants' witness, Bowden, by one
of counsel for appellees, this occurred: 'Q. You
went out there, representing the State of Arkansas, representing the defendants and an insurance
company, and made those measurements?' to
which objection was made, and the court said:
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'That is improper and you better not make any
other remarks like that.' An exception was takl•n
and counsel asked for a mistrial on those remarks.
to which the court replied: 'If he does it again I
will grant a new trial.'
I

"The statement of counsel for appellees, in-·
jecting into the case the fact, if it be a fact, that
appellants had insurance coverage, was wholly
inexcusable, uncalled for by anything that had
previously occurred in the case, and was highly
prejudicial. We think the remarks of the court
were not sufficient to remove the prejudice and
that a mistrial should have been declared. The
obvious and only purpose in making the statement was to advise the jury that an insurance
company would have to pay any judgment rendered. This was error."
In Peay v. Panich, (Ark.) 8? S. W. (2d) 23, it was
asked: "Q. Mr. Henson has shown you a statement you
signed that was made before an insurance adjuster, who
called on you shortly after the accident? Mr. Henson:
'Defendant objects to the question as being prejudicial
and asks the court to declare a mistrial.' " Although the
trial court admonished the jury, the appellate court held
that there was reversible error and the prejudice was
not removed.
In Poland v. Dunbar, (Maine) 25? Atl. 381, counsel
for the defense had introduced without objection a statement of the plaintiff unfavorable to her case. On crossSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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examination, plaintiff's counsel after having plaintiff
identify her signature asked: "'After the statement was
made and signed, did you then learn who this man represented?' A. 'I did.' Q. 'And whom did he represent?'"
and over defendant's objection, she answered, "'The insurance company.'" The court held this reversible error.
In Simpson v. Foundation Company, (N. Y.) 95
N. E. 10, there was reversible error where it was brought
out in the evidence that certain statements had been
made and conversations had with employees of a certain
insurance company.

In Manigold v. Black River Traction Company, 80
N. Y. S. 861, the question was asked: "Didn't Dr. Rockwell go there to try and settle with Manigold, and wasn't
he representing the insurance company back of this
company?" The court said:
"In order to protect the defendant, its counsel was forced to object to the question and yet
by doing so, he in effect admitted the fact."
Dr. Rockwell was not a witness in the case, and,
"No other conclusion can be reached than
that the witness was asked and the statement
made by plaintiff's counsel for the sole purpose
of getting before the jury a fact which he was
not entitled to and for the purpose of improperly
influencing its action."
See also:
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Levy v. J. L. Mott Iron \Yorks. 127 N. Y. S. 506:
Wilkins v. Schwartz. (W. Va.) 132 S. E. 887:
Fleming v. Hartrick. (\V. Va.) 141 S. E. 628;
Wiersema v. Lockwood & Strickland Co .• 147 Ill.
App. 33.
In each of the California cases of Citti v. Bava, 266
Pac. 954, Squires v. Riffe, 287 Pac. 360, Rising v. Veatch,
3 Pac. (2d) 1023, and Schlenker v. Egloff, 24 Pac. (2d)
224, it was held that the matter of insurance being injected into the case was prejudicial error based upon
the fact that the attorney for the plaintiff knew or was
presumed to have known that the answer of the witness would refer to the matter of insurance, and that
he intentionally asked the objectionable question for that
purpose and the fact that the matter was sought to be
brought in under guise of an admission was no excuse.
In the Citti case, it was said:
''The natural tendency of a line of examination that suggests to the jury that the defendant
is indemnified against any judgment for damages
against him is highly prejudicial to his rights,
especially in a closely balanced case where the
evidence otherwise would be easily sufficient on
appeal to support a verdict either for the plaintiff or for the defendant.

"It is impossible for us to state that the jury
would not have found a different verdict had the
objectionable examination not taken place and
the evidence not been admitted."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

48

In the Rising case it was said:
"The courts have so frequently, and in the
strongest terms, condemned the eliciting of evidence concerning insurance against liability carried by defendants that no excuse can be conceived for counsel bringing it out, and the practice is so recurrent as to call for the sternest
measures by both trial and appellate courts whenever it occurs."
In Hankins et al v. Hall, (Okla.) 54 Pac. (2d) 609,
judgment was reversed where it was brought out through
questioning a witness that a gentleman from an insurance
company had taken a statement.

In Allen v. Wilkerson, (Mo.) 8'7 S. W. (2d) 1056, the
question was asked: "I want you to state to the jury
whether or not you signed any report or statement for
this insurance adjuster who came and talked with you?"
The court said:
"Inasmuch as no legitimate purpose could
be subserved by the development of the insurance
features and the only effect it could have was that
it would impress the jurors' minds with the idea
that the woman defendant was not really inter·
ested in the outcome of the case and that an
indemnity insurance company would have to bear
the loss in any event, it necessarily follows that
its effect could not be otherwise than harmful to
the defendant's side of the case."
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In Trent v. Lechtman Printing Company, (Mo.) 126
S. W. 238, in cross examination of one of defendant's
witnesses, counsel in referring to one of defendant's
attorneys asked: "When he came down, didn't he say
that he had been sent there by the insurance company
to investigate the matter?" Judgment reversed.
In Cameron v. Pacific Lime and Gypsum Company,
(Ore.) 144 Pac. 446, it was held reversible error where
there was an intentional effort on counsel's part on crossexamination, to bring out that a certain statement was
given to an agent of the insurance company.
In JVilson v. Wesler, (Ohio) 160 N. E. 863, in crossexamining a witness, after asking about certain facts
concerning the accident, counsel asked: "'Didn't you
report to your Insurance Company that you went
straight catercornered across that corner?' A. 'No, Sir,
I did not.' The trial court at that time instructed the
jury that the question was improper and that they
should disregard it." In reversing the judgment on appeal
the court said:
"The only purpose to which this question
could have been asked was to have it brought to
the attention of the jury that an insurance company was defending the action."
In Stoskoff v. Wickland, (N. Dak.) 193 N. W. 312, it
is said:
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"By objection, the matter was particularly
called to the attention of the jury. On the other
hand, a party should not be deprived of his privilege to urge a valid objection because a greater
prejudice might follow. He should not be subject to a possible penalty for insisting upon a
proper regard for his rights. Rather the penalty,
if penalty there be, should be visited upon the
real party at fault."
In Georgeson v. Nielson, (Wis.) 260 N. W. 461, it was
said:
"The situation is one that all too frequently
arises. A remark is made by counsel, known by
him to be improper and made with intent and
expectation that it will improperly influence the
jury to the advantage of his client and the disadvantage of the opposing party. No extraneous
evidence is needed to establish such intent. If
such result is not intended, why are such remarks
made? Objection to the remark of opposing counsel enhances likelihood that the intended effect
will be produced both by attracting attention to
it and by invoking a repetition. The remark being
made, or made and repeated, the intended effect
is probably produced. * ~" ~" Even a reprimand
to offending counsel 'does not cure the wrong
done to litigants' by prejudicial remarks."
The following cases hold misconduct of counsel in
questioning or eliciting answers from witnesses injecting
the matter of insurance directly or indirectly into the case
during the course of the trial and in the presence of the
jury is inexcusable and so prejudicial, particularly where
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there is a conflict in the evidence as to defendant's liability, as to require a new trial or a reversal of the judgment, and an instruction cannot cure the error.

JVatson v. Adarru, (Ala.) 65 So. 528;
Blue Bar Taxi Cab & Transfer Co. v. Hudspeth,
(Ariz.) 216 Pac. 246:
Fike v. Grant, (Ariz.) 8 Pac. (2d) 242;
Consolidated Motors Inc. v. Ketcham, (Ariz.) 66
Pac. (2d) 246;
JVard v. Haralson, (Ark.) 120 S. W. (2d) 322;
Peay v. Panich, (Ark.) 8? S. W. (2d) 23;
Niclwls v. Smith, (Cal.) 28 Pac. (2d) 693;
Citti v. Bava, (Cal.) 266 Pac. 954;
Squires v. Riffe, (Cal.) 28? Pac. 360;
Rising v. Veatch, (Cal.) 3 Pac. (2d) 1023;
Schlenker v. Egloff, (Cal.) 24 Pac. (2d) 224;
Coe v. VonWhy, (Colo.) 80 Pac 894;
]ames Stewart & Co. v. Newby, (4th C. C. A.) 266
Fed. 28?;
Crossler v. Safeway Stores, (Ida.) 6 Pac. (2d) 151;
Wiersema v. Lockwood & Strickland Co., 14? Ill.
App. 33;
Rudd v. jackson, (Iowa) 213 N. W. 428;
Rutherford v. Gilchrist, (Iowa) 255 N. W. 516;
Floy v. Hibbard, (Iowa) 28? N. W. 829;
Coffman v. Shearer, (Kan.) 34 Pac. (2d) 9?;
Forsyth v. Church, (Kan.) 42 Pac. (2d) 9?5;
Star Furniture Co. v. Holland, (Ky.) 11? S. W.
(2d) 603;
Poland v. Dunbar, (Maine) 15? Atl. 381;
Herrin v. Daly, (Miss.) 31 So. ?90;
Whatley v. Bovlas, (Miss.) 1?? So. 1;
Allen v. Wilkerson, (Mo.) 8? S. W. (2d) 1056;
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Trent v. Lechtman Printing Company, (Mo.) 126

s. w.

238;

Olian v. Olian, (Mo.) 59 S. W. (2d) 673;
Rytersky v. O'Brine, (Mo.) 70 S. W. (2d) 538;
Robinson v. McVay, (Mo.) 44 S. W. (2d) 238;
Vonault v. O'Rourke, (Mont.) 33 Pac. {2d) 535;
Gerry v. N ewgebauer, (N. H.) 136 Atl. ?'51;
Young v. Osgood, {N. H.) 163 Atl. 398;
Manigold v. Black River Traction Co., 80 N. Y.
S. 861;
Simpson v. Foundation Co., {N. Y.) 95 N. E. 10;
Chernick v. Independent American Ice Cream Co.,
121 N. Y. S. 352;

Levy v. ]. L. Mott Iron Works, 127 N. Y. S. 506;
Hordern v. Salvation Army, 109 N. Y. S. 131;
Loughlin v. Brassil, (N. Y.) 79 N. E. 854;
Stoskoff v. Wicklund, (N.D.) 193 N. W. 312;
Wilson v. Wesler, (Ohio) 160 N. E. 863;
Hankins v. Hall, (Okla.) 54 Pac. {2d) 609;
Brotten v. White, (Okla.) 75 Pac. {2d) 4?'4;
Dolliver v. Lathion, (Okla.) 82 Pac. {2d) 675;
Rosumny v. Marks, (Ore.) 246 Pac. ?'23;
Cameron v. Pacific Lime & Gypsum Co., (Ore.)
144 Pac. 446;
Ross v. Willamette Valley Transfer Company,
{Ore.) 248 Pac. 1088;
Zeller v. Pickovsky, {S. D.) 268 N. W. 729;
Gose v. Ballard, (Tex.) 12 S. W. {2d) 1067;
Texas Co. v. Betterton, (Tex.) 88 S. W. (2d) 1038;
The Fair v. Preisach, (Tex) ?'?' S. W. (2d) 725;
Water Light and Ice Co. of Weatherford v. Barnett,
(Tex.) 212 S. W. 236;
Page v. Thomas, (Tex.) 71 S. W. (2d) 234;
Beaumont Traction Co. v. Dilworth, (Tex.) 94 S.

w.

352;

Carter v. Walker, (Tex.) 165 S. W. 483;
Roman v. ]. G. Turnbull Co., (Vt.) 131 Atl. 788;
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Lanham v. Bond, (Va.) 160 S. E. 89:
Iverson v. McDonnell, (Wash.) 78 Pac. 202:
JVesley v. w·ashington Brick, Lime & Mmz. Co ..
(Wash.) 82 Pac. 2'71:

Birch v. Abercombie, ('Vash.) 133 Pac. 1020;
Shay v. Horr, ('Vash.) 139 Pac. 604;
Wilkins v. Schwartz, (W.Va.) 132 S. E. 88'7:
Atkins v. Bartlett, ('V. Va.) 132 S. E. 885;
Papke v. Haerle, ('Vis.) 20'7 N. W. 261.
C.

ARGUMENT TO THE JURY

Wholly outside the record, counsel in his closing
argument stated: "On the day of the accident, or soon
thereafter, an investigator or adjuster was out at the
scene of the accident." (Dft. Ah. 123-124). And still not being satisfied, he endeavored to tell the jury that the appellant was being defended by an insurance company
through its counsel by stating: "That the defendant secured an attorney who spends all his time in the defense
of this class of cases." (Dft. Ah. 123). This was misconduct
itself sufficient to require a reversal and being coupled
with misconduct in examination of jurors and questioning witnesses requires a reversal of this case.
Wagnon et al v. Brown, (Okla.) 36 Pac. (2d) '723:
"(3) Assignment 6 is based on the following
remark of plaintiff's attorney in his closing argument to the jury:
" 'I may in my weak way be unable to answer the argument of Mr. Sandlin, and with all
these other counsel here for the insurance people.'
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"Counsel for defendants objected to the
reference to insurance and the objection was sus.
tained; the court also instructed the jury to dis·
regard any evidence to which it had sustained
objection.

"* ~-: * For reasons which are fully set forth
in that opinion, we hold that assignment of error
No. 6 should be sustained.
"This cause is reversed and remanded for
new trial."
In Messinger v. Karg, (Ohio) 192 N. E. 864, it was
argued to the jury that "she (meaning Mrs. Messinger)
is just trying to defend herself. Maybe these folks have
her scared by trying to make her believe she has to
pay. * * *" The judgment was reversed for misconduct
of counsel, there being conflicting testimony on the issue
of negligence in the case, the court pointing out:
"It might well be that the insurance company
would have some defense, or as sometimes happens
in these days, it might prove to be insolvent."

I

and thus the responsibility of paying falls on the de·
fendant personally.

In Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Brown, (Okla.)
38 Pac. (2d) 529, where counsel during his argument to
the jury suggested the defendant might be under bond,
in reversing the judgment, the court said:
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"'In a suit for personal InJUries. after the
jury has been sworn and placed in the jury box.
no references should be made as to whether or not
the defendant carried insurance. and if such references are made it is reversible error. although
the trial court instructs the jury not to consider
the same.'
"This sort of argument we cannot approve. It
it not harmless error. It is like a rapier thrust in
a vital spot and then withdrawing the blade with
apologies. Lawsuits should he won on their merits,
and not by ingenious argument fraught with unfair assertions sought to procure an unfair advantage over one's adversary based upon propositions
that in the very nature of things counsel should
know is not, and could not be, competent testimony in the case. As above stated, neither an
attorney nor his client should be permitted to
gain an advantage by such conduct."
In Ingerich v. Mess. (2nd C. C. A.) 63 Fed. (2d) 233,
in reversing the judgment for improper argument, it
was said:
"(4) In summing up to the jury, the attorney
for the plaintiff seized the opportunity to say, 'We
have sued here merely for $5,000.00 for reasons
which we cannot explain, which we are not permitted to explain;' and, after alluding to the injuries the plaintiff had sustained, urging the jury
to award the full amount sued for, and stating
that the actual damages sustained were 'many
thousand more,' to say, in speaking of the defendant, that 'while my friend has been shedding
crocodile tears for John Mess, this nice boy here,
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we do not even want a button off his vest.' The
defendant immediately moved for a mistrial, but
his motion was denied. Plainly these remarks had
but one purpose. That was to convey to the jury
the information that a verdict for the entire ad
dumnum would be for no more than the amount
of the insurance carried by the defendant."
In Standridge v. Martin, (Ala.) 84 So. 266, where
counsel's argument to the jury was suggestive of insurance, the judgment was reversed, the court saying:
"Such a subject once lodged in the minds of
the jury is almost certain to stick in their conscience and to have its effect upon their verdict,
regardless of any theoretical exclusion of it by the
trial judge.''
In Edwards v. Earnest, (Ala.) 89 So. 729, plaintiff's
counsel in argument indirectly by illustration mentioned
insurance and the fact that a Mr. Trockmorton was in
the insurance business. There was reversible error and
the admonitions of the trial judge could not eradicate
the error.
The following cases hold misconduct of counsel in
suggesting directly or indirectly in argument to the jury
that there is insurance in the case, either alone, or together with the mentioning of insurance through witnesses or on voir dire examination of jurors, particularly
where there is a conflict in the evidence on the issue of
liability, is inexcusable and so prejudicial as to require
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a new trial or a reversal of the judgment, and an • instruction cannot cure the error.

Standridge v. lllartin, (Ala.) 84 So. 266;
Edwards v. Earnest, (Ala.) 89 So. 729;
Pickwick Stage Lines Inc. v. Edwards, (10th C.
C. A.) 64 Fed. (2d) 758;
lngerick l.'. 1lless, (2nd C. C. A.) 63 Fed. (2d) 233;
Volkmann v. Brossman, 129 Ill. App. 182;
Emery Dry Goods Co. v. DeHart, 130 Ill. App. 244;
Turner v. Lovington Coal .Uining Co., 156 Ill. App.
60:
Briggs v. Golden Cream Dairy, (Ill.) 19 N. E. (2d)
126;
Ryan v. Simeons, (Iowa) 229 N. W. 667;
1VcCornack v. Pickerell, (Iowa) 283 N. W. 899;
Pool v. Day, (Kan.) 40 Pac. (2d) 396;
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Commonwealth,
(Ky.) 21 S. W. (2d) 452;
Easton v. Medema, (Mich.) 224 N. W. 636;
Bergendahl v. Rabeler, (Neb.) 268 N. W. 459;
Stanley v. Whiteville Lumber Co., (N. Car.) 114
S. E. 385;
1llessinger v. Karg, (Ohio) 192 N. E. 864;
Wagnon v. Brown, (Okla.) 36 Pac. (2d) 723;
Harris v. Elliott, (Okla.) 61 Pac. (2d) 1089;
Leonard v. Stepp, (Okla.) 53 Pac. (2d) 1110;
Yoast v. Sims, (Okla.) 253 Pac. 504;
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Brown, (Okla.}
38 Pac. (2d) 529;
Burgess v. Germany-Ray-Brown Co., (S. Car.) 113
S. E. 118;
Kloppenburg v. Kloppenburg, (S. Dak.) 280 N. W.
209;
Coon v. Manley, (Tex.) 196 S. W. 606;
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Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Owens, (Tex.) 54 S. W.
(2d) 848;
Landry v. Hubert, (Vt.) 13? Atl. 97;
Rinehart & Dennis Co. Inc. v. Brown, (Va.) 120
S. E. 269;

Georgeson v. Nielson, (Wis.) 260 N. W. 461.

IMPROPER INSTRUCTIONS

I. The court's instruction No. 11 (Dft. Ab. 113)
legally and practically instructed the jury that appellant,
Kenneth Butte, was required to drive the automobile
truck "so that he could avoid injuring anyone or colliding with any person on the highway," that is, so as to
avoid an accident resulting from any danger that might
be encountered. Appellant's duty in the operation of
his automobile was to operate the same in a reasonable
and prudent manner, so as to avoid injuring any person
upon the highway and in the exercise of due care, and
was not to avoid injuring anyone or colliding with any
person, if such persons were not in the exercise of due
care, at least unless and until appellant had an opportunity of knowing that such other persons were not exercising due care and at which time an accident could
then he avoided. Stating it another way, this instruction
and particularly the language above quoted, and the
portions particularly excepted to (Dft. Ab. 124) failed
to take into consideration the right of the defendant to
assume that all other persons would lawfully use the
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highway and would exercise reasonable and ordinary
care until put upon notice to the contrary.

It is the rule in this jurisdiction and others, that
one has a right to assume that others using the highway
will obey the law of the road and exercise ordinary care
and when two automobiles approach an intersection at
approximately the same time, the driver on the right
(having the statutory right of way) has the right to
assume that the disfavored driver (on the left) will
obey the law of the road and not approach at an excessive speed nor dart in front of the other car, but
will yield the right of way to him, and such driver
coming into the intersection from the right may proceed
acting on such assumption until reasonably put on notice
to the contrary.
In Ferguson v. Reyrwlds, 52 Utah 583, 1?6 Pac. 26?,
it was said:

" * * * The plaintiff had a right to assume
that the driver of the automobile would exercise
ordinary care in driving the car. This certainly
is the law everywhere. No one using a public
street or being lawfully thereon is required to
assume otherwise than that all persons using the
same will exercise ordinary care in doing so and
will not expose any one on the street to unnecessary danger."
In Williams v. Globe Grain & Milling Company, 64
Utah 82, 228 Pac. 192, it was held that the plaintiff
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approaching from the right, even if the other vehicle
could or should have been seen "would not alone preclude his recovery, because it would remain for the jury
to say whether under all the circumstances the plaintiff was justified in depending upon defendant's driver
observing his duty to keep his omnibus under contro]
and yield the right of way to plaintiff," and it was
error to direct a verdict in favor of defendant, who had
approached from plaintiff's left.
In Barrett v. Alamito Dairy Co., (Neb.) 181 N. W.
550, recovery in favor of the plaintiff who was approaching the intersection from the right was sustained as
against the other driver on this theory, the court saying that the "driver had the right to act on this assumption until a situation was presented which would suggest to ·a reasonable person that the occupants of the
car were being placed in a position of danger. It then.
became the duty of the wagon driver to exercise all
reasonable precaution to avoid a collision."
In Simon v. Lite Bros. Inc., (Pa.) 10'7 Atl. 635, regarding such duty, it was said that he was not "req~ired
to anticipate and guard against the want of ordinary
care on the part of another" and "guard against collision with a car approaching at * * * excessive speed."
In Richards v. Neault, (Maine) 135 Atl. 524, the
situation was precisely like that in the instant case,
there being conflicting testimony on the right of way
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and speed. A verdict for defendant was sustained. the
court saying:

"It would not he unreasonable for the jury to
conclude. as the defendant testified that he did
not realize that the Lovioe car was not going to
stop and give him the right of way until he was
so near the point of collision that he could not
avoid it, that he turned his car to the left so far
as he could and put on his brakes, that he was
not guilty of negligence in assuming that Lovioe
would give him the right of way, and that his
exceeding the statutory limit of speed in no way
contributed to the accident."
See also Sliter v. Clark, (Wash.) 220 Pac. ?85; Roe
v. Kurtz, (Iowa) 210 N. W. 550; and Merrifield v. Hoffberger, (Md.) 12? Atl. 500.
The application of this rule of reasonable reliance
until put on notice to the contrary would particularly
apply in the instant case in that there was a store on
the $.;«;east corner, eighteen feet south of the south
curb line of Third Avenue (Dft. Ah. 88); that Gerald
Franz was traveling forty miles per hour, or fifty-nine
feet per second, and did not even see the Butte truck
until he was into the intersection (Dft. Ah. 66) and then
tried to heat it across the intersection. (Dft. Ah. 62). As
described by Miss Chamberlain, "It shot up in front of
us." (Dft. Ah. 94). The testimony and the physical facts
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ably apparent that the Franz car was not going to yield
the right of way, did everything possible to avoid a
collision in applying his brakes and turning to the
~ight to parallel the cars. (Dft. Ab. 106). In Farrell v.
Cameron, (Utah) 94 Pac. (2d) 1068, it is pointed out that,
"it takes .75 seconds for a normal person to act after
observing danger." Under such circumstances, it would
be reasonable for the jury to find that before a reasonably prudent person in the position of Kenneth Butte,
in the exercise of ordinary care could observe that Gerald Franz was approaching at an unlawful speed intending to recklessly usurp the right of way by cutting
directly in front of defendant's truck, that reasonable
action on his part could not have avoided the accident.
In Knutson v. Lurie, (Iowa) 251 N. W. 147, a case
arising out of an intersection collision, an instruction
much like that in the instant case was held to erroneously define the duty of defendant and was reversible error.
The instruction first stated in general terms that it was
the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary care,
but added that if there was danger of collision, "it is
his duty to reduce the speed of his car so

***

he can

bring his vehicle to a stop and avoid injury." The court
said that this instruction was erroneous because it required her to avoid injury "whether a reasonably prudent person could do so or not.

* * *

Obviously the in-

struction, even when read with the remainder of the
court's charge was prejudicial."
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In Loony v. Parker, (Iowa) 230 N. W. 570, an instruction requiring the defendant "to maintain such control of his car as to enable him to stop without hitting
the car ahead of him" was erroneous as requiring the
driver to exercise such control as to '"avoid collision
whether he was negligent or not. ..
In Gregory v. Suhr, (Iowa) 268 N. W. 14, a new trial
was properly granted where an instruction had been
given which tended to impose upon the defendant the
absolute duty of having his automobile under such control as to avoid a collision. See also Fry v. Smith, (Iowa)
253 N. W. 147.
In Boutelle v. White, (Ga.) 149 S. E. 805, an instruction among other things requiring defendant to exercise
"the degree of diligence * * * necessary to avoid injuring others" was properly refused as imposing the
duty of an insurer. And in Giles v. Voiles, {Ga.) 88 S. E.
207, the giving of an instruction containing the same
language as in the Boutelle case was held reversible
error, the court saying:

"This imposed on defendant the duty of observing the diligence required of an insurer and
eliminated all such questions as accident, contributory negligence, and the duty of plaintiff to
exercise ordinary care to avoid the consequences
of defendant's negligence."
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In Grandhagen v. Grandhagen, (Wis.) 225 N. W.
935, it was reversible error to instruct the jury "that it

is the duty of every driver of a motor car upon the
highway to keep his automobile at all times under control, and if he fails to have his car under control he is
guilty of want of ordinary care." The court said that
this "imposed an undue burden upon the defendant. The
duty of Oscar Grandhagen was to exercise ordinary care
to keep his automobile under control. The instruction imposed the absolute duty to keep the automobile under
control at all times, regardless of the question of whether
ordinary care was exercised in so doing."
Instruction No. 11 is further erroneous 1n that it
attempts to define defendant's duty to pedestrians as
well as occupants of other vehicles. This is misleading
in that at an intersection where there is a crosswalk, if
there is reasonable probability of collision, the pedestrian has the right of way over the automobile, (Section
5'7-'7-35 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933) whereas between

automobiles the right of way is determined from other
considerations. In Merrifield v. Hoffberger Co., (Md.) 127
Atl. 500, it is pointed out that the duty of an automobile
driver as to pedestrians is different from that of his
duty to other automobile drivers for two reasons, namely
(1) the pedestrian would have the right of way at inter-

sections, whereas another automobile might not; (2) because of the capacity to injure a pedestrian, the duty
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toward such pedestrian is increased. Iustruction No. 11
should have eliminated the reference to pedestrians.
Instruction 11 given by the court was of the utmos\
importance and highly prejudicial to the defendant in
that it erroneously defined to the jury the duty of defendant in the operation of his automobile and had a
direct hearing on the issue of defendant's negligence.
Had the jury been properly instructed on the duty of
defendant, it might well have found from the evidence
either that the defendant was not negligent or that the
speed of Gerald A. Franz, his failure to keep a lookout
and to yield the right of way and his attempt to beat
defendant's truck across the intersection was the sole
proximate cause of the collision.
II. Instruction No. 12 (Dft. Ab. 114) duly excepted
to by appellant (Dft. Ab. 125) is clearly erroneous and
prejudicial. The City Ordinance, Section 1382, (Dft. Ab.
7) is the same ordinance that this court construed in
the case of State v. Lingman, (Utah) 91 Pac. (2d) 45'7,
which ordinance was held to be in violation of Section
57-'7-16, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended by
Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935, in that the state statute
provides among other things in substance, that driving
in excess of twenty-five miles an hour in any residential
district is prima facie evidence that the speed is not
reasonable or prudent, and hence unlawful; whilst the
instruction given based on the ordinance held void in
the Lingman case provided that "it is unlawful for any
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person to drive in a vehicle in a residential district in
excess of twenty-five miles per hour" and that defendant
was negligent if he exceeded such speed. This instruction was a clear misstatement of the law and most prejudicial to defendant on the issue of negligence, defendant
being entitled to have the jury correctly instructed on
the question of unlawful speed.
III. Instruction No. 14 (Dft. Ab .. 115) duly excepted
to (Dft. Ab. 125) was improper and misleading in two
respects; (1) That it failed to define, and the remainder
of the instructions failed to define, what constituted a
first entry into the intersection. In other words, under
such instruction, even though the jury concluded that
the cars entered the intersection at substantially the
same time so that if each continued at the same rate of
speed that an accident would occur, yet, if the Franz
car entered the intersection one inch ahead of defendant's
car, or one-one-hundredth of a second before the defendant's car entered the intersection, then it would have
the right of way, although defendant was approaching
from the right. Such a construction is a strained and
unreasonable one and such as would operate to encourage drivers approaching an intersection from the
left to increase speed in an effort to beat the other automobile approaching from the right by a fraction of a
second or of an inch, rather than fairly place the responsibility on the driver approaching from the left to yield
to the driver on the right. (2) That the instruction wholly
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fails to take into consideration contributory negligence
on the part of the deceased, but unqualifiedly tells the
jury that if the defendant failed to yield the right of way
and such failure was the proximate cause of the injury
that their verdict should be for plaintiff. There was
ample evidence to show that the deceased failed to exercise any care for his own safety. It was stipulated (Dft.
Ab. 8?') that deceased made no complaint about speed, nor
warning of the approaching truck driven by appellant,
and as there was evidence that the Ford V-8 in which
deceased was riding was traveling in excess of thirtyfive miles an hour across an intersection in a residential
district, and as there was evidence that the vision to
the right was unobstructed for a distance of more than
a block, the jury would have been justified in finding
that deceased, who was riding on the right side of the
car with an opportunity to observe the approaching
truck and appreciate the danger of crossing an intersection at such a rate of speed, did not use reasonable
and ordinary care. The fact that instruction No. 16
specifically instructed the jury on the issue of contributory negligence of deceased and that most of the
other instructions took into consideration the same issue,
but that this instruction did not do so, but placed upon
the jury the absolute duty of finding for the plaintiff
regardless of deceased's negligence, makes this instruction particularly vicious, and authorities hold such erronl~ous

instruction is reversible error.
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In Keena v. United R. R. Co. of S. F., (Cal.) 207
Pac. 35, an instruction like that given in the instant
case was reversible error in that by its terms it purported
to settle the conditions necessary to the predication of a
verdict for plaintiff, but omitted from its consideration
the issue of contributory negligence, and the fact that
the court, in other places, had fully instructed the jury
on the defenses of contributory negligence and its importance in the case, could not and did not cure the
error, because this merely created a hopeless conflict
between the instructions, and, therefore, was not capable
of being harmonized. It was said:
"In such case it is impossible to determine
which of the conflicting rules presented to them
was followed by the jury and the error in any of
the instructions must be deemed prejudicial."
The following cases all sustain the same rule:

Peirce v. United Gas & Elec. Co. (Cal.) 118 Par.
700;
Beyerle v. Clift, (Cal.) 209 Pac. 1015;
Sinan v. Atcheson T. & S. F. R. Co., (Cal.) 284
Pac. 1041;
LaRue v. Powell, (Cal.) 42 Pac. (2d) 1063;
Oklahoma R. Co. v. Milam, (Okla.) 147 Pac. 314:
Shell Pipe Line Co. v. Robinson, (10th C. C. A.)
66 Fed. (2d) 861;
Bauer & johnson Co. v. National Roofing Co.,
(Neb.) 187 N. W. 59;
Birmingham E. & B. R. Co. v. Hoskins, (Ala.) 39
So. 338;
McVey v. St. Clair Co., (W. Va.) 38 S. E. 648.
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RIGHT OF WAY

Section 5?-?-31, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides:
"The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle
which has entered the intersection. When two
vehicles enter an intersection at the same time the
driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield to the
driver on the right."

Section 5?-1-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, defined an "intersection" as:
"The area embraced within the prolongation
or connection of the lateral curb lines, or, if none,
then of the lateral boundary lines of two or more
highways which join one another at an angle,
whether or not one highway crosses the other."
The impracticability of this definition as relating
to the respective rights of way at intersections was acknowledged in that said section was expressly repealed,
CJ:Iapter 46, Laws of Utah, 1935, and no attempt was
made to define an intersection in the 1935 laws, nor
as last amended, Chapter 65 Laws of 1937. In interpreting "intersection" therefore, reference must be made
to the cases and not the statutes.
The first sentence of Section 5'?-?-31, supra, is simply
declarative of the common law. In Knox v. North Jersey
St. Ry. Co., (N. J.) 57 Atl. 423, it is said: "The rule is
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*

~':

* the first to reach the crossing traveling at a rea-

sonable rate of speed has the right to pass first. * * *
This rule is a part of the common law of the state." In
.~1 ayer v. Mellette, (Ind.) 114 N. E. 241, as "appellee
was * * * closer to the intersection than appellant and
the record disclosing no ordinance or regulation to the
contrary, appellee apparently had the right of way."
In Barrett v. Alamito Dairy Co., (Neb.) 181 N. W. 550,
supra, it is said that "under the law of the road, defendant's driver, having first entered upon the intersection of
the two streets, in the absence of some regulation to the
contrary, had the right of way." See also Yuill v. Berryman, (Wash.) 162 Pac. 513; JV. F. ]ahn & Co. v. Paynter,
(Wash.) 170 Pac. 132; Couchman v. Snelling, (Cal.) 295
Pac. 845; Page v. Mazzei, (Cal.) 3 Pac. (2d) 11.
The second sentence of Section 5?-?-31 IS a regulation unknown to the common law, but, like in most
states, adopted for the purpose of determining precedence
between vehicles that would otherwise collide. Many
states in determining the right of way hold that regard
should be had to the "point of intersection of the auto·
mobiles" while a few states hold that regard should be
had to the boundaries of the street or the area within the
prolongation of the lateral curbs. As above pointed out
the Utah Legislature expressly revoked the latter defini·
tion but at any rate, under either view, the authorities
hold that the rule in determining the right of way is
one of practical application rather than a matter of fractions of feet or seconds, and that if the cars appear that
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they will intersect at "approximately" the same time,
having due regard to the relative speeds and all the
circumstances, and a collision or interference between
them is reasonably to be apprehended, then the car
on the left should yield the right of way.
In Founier v. linn, (Mass.) 154 N. E. 268, where the
intersection is treated as the place common to both
highways and not the intersecting paths of the automobiles, the court says as to the duty of the driver from
the left:
"Nor could he take the risk of proceeding
because he was a few feet nearer the intersecting
point than the defendant and concluded he could
proceed across the intersection area in time to
avoid a collision."
And in· Neumann v. Apter, (Conn.) 112 Atl. 350,
where "intersection" is similarly defined, the term "arriving at such intersection at approximately the same
instant" is to he interpreted such that "the driver of an
automobile approaching the intersection * * * must
when an automobile is approaching such intersection
from his right give such approaching automobile the right
to cross the intersection before him, if a man of ordinary
prudence in his situation in the exercise of due care
would reasonably believe that if the two automobiles
continued to run at the rate of speed at which they are
then running, such continuance of their course would
involve the risk of a collision."
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In Roe v. Kurtz, (Iowa) 210 N. W. 550, it is said:
"Regard will not be had to fractions of seconds." In
Weber v. Gruenbaum Co., (Pa.) 113 Atl. 413, there should
be "a substantial distance." In Schumann v. Hall, 219 N.
Y. S. 228, the court said that the right of way rule applies where "the relative distances and speeds are not
materially unequal." In Ray Mead Co., Inc. v. Products
Mfg. Co., 180 N. Y. S. 641, it was held that an instruction should not be confined to mere distances. And in

Shirley v. Larkin Co., (N. Y.) 145 N. E. ?51, it was said:
"Neither ~" * ~·: is the statute to be interpreted
as meaning that the driver of a car limited by
subordinate rights may go forward to the point of
intersection because a hasty and unreliable computation seems to indicate that he is a few feet
nearer the point of intersection than the car on
his right, and that, therefore, he possibly might
be able to dash across the line of the latter and
escape a collision. The rule of construction must
be guided by reason and common sense, and if
it appears that the relative positions of the two
cars, taking into account distances from the point
of intersection and speed, is such that damage of
a collision may reasonably be apprehended, if
the car on the left proceeds, it is the duty of its
driver to slow up or stop and give the car on
the right the precedence which is guaranteed by
the statute."
In Collins v. Liddle, 6? Utah 242, 24? Pac. 4?6, the
rule was stated as follows:
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..If under the circumstances of the case the
relative situation of the parties and the speed at
which they are driving are such that a eollision
is reasonably to be apprehended. then, as we understand the law, it is the dutv of the driver on
the left to yield the right of ~\?ay to the driver
on the right. This interpretation of the meaning
of statutes and ordinances, in substance, the same
as the Utah statute, finds support among both
text-writers and adjudicated cases. An instruction to that effect is quoted with approval in
Bryant v. Bingham Stage Line, 60 Utah, at page
309. 208 P. 541."
I

And it was held erroneous to use the word "immenent"
in place of the words "reasonably to be apprehended."
In Golden Eagle Dry Goods Co. v. Mockbee, (Colo.)
189 Pac. 850, an instruction similar to instruction No. 14
given in the instant case was held erroneous and reversible error in that such instruction fails to take into consideration the point of possible collision and other practicable considerations. The court said:
"The instruction is impracticable because, in
many cases in which collision is likely, when two
machines are near enough to know that they will
reach the street intersection simultaneously, it is
too late to consider the question of right of way.
"Again, the instruction requires every driver

to look both right and left to see whether any of
the cars on either side will touch the street intersection before or with him, an impracticable task.
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"We think the right rule is that it is the
duty of every driver when approaching a street
intersection to use reasonable care to see whether
there is likelihood of collision with any car approaching from the right, and, if there is, to yield
to it the right of way, and to keep his car under
such control that he can do so. Livingstone v. Barney, 62 Colo. 528, 163 Pac. 863; Colo., etc., Ry. Co.
v. Cohun, 180 Pac. 307."
We submit that Instruction 14 erroneously stated
the rule of right of way and erroneously excluded as a
condition essential to recovery the issue of plaintiff's
contributory negligence and was reversible error.
IV. Instruction No. 15 (Dft. Ab. 116) excepted to
(Dft. Ab. 125) is confusing and would certainly mislead the jury. It in substance told the jury that if the
defendant was negligent, that the negligence of Gerald
Franz, with whom deceased was riding, would not constitute a defense. If both cars were negligently driven,
the jury upon a proper presentation of the law could
well have found that the negligence of Gerald Franz
was the sole proximate cause of the accident. As for
example, appellant in driving west on Third Avenue
could have been driving two miles an hour in excess of
the speed limit, which might constitute negligence. On
the other hand, Gerald Franz, with whom deceased was
riding might under the evidence have been driving north
on K Street forty miles an hour, with a failure to yield
the right of way to appellant's car first entering from
the right. In such event, both might be negligent, and
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yet the jury could have properly found that the sole
proximate cause was the negligence of Gerald Franz.
and that the accident would still have occurred even had
appellant been driving less than twenty-five miles an
hour. In view of the evidence the effect of this instruction was to lead the jury to believe that it should pay
no attention to the negligence, if any, of Franz, and in
effect made the defendant liable regardless of the question of proximate cause. Bennett v. Robertson, (Vt.) t'l'l
Atl. 625. Cases are hereafter cited to the effect that negligence is not always the proximate cause of the accident.

V. Instruction No. 1?' (Dft. Ah. 11?') excepted to
{Dft. Ab. 125) is erroneous for the same reason that Instruction No. 14 was erroneous and constituted such a
duplication of that erroneous rule as to place undue emphasis upon it. As pointed out in the exception
(Ab. 126) it undertook to lay down an impracticable rule
by leaving it up to the drivers of automobiles approaching intersections at such speeds that they would travel
thirty-six feet a second and could not apply brakes before
traveling from the curbline to the center of the intersection before determining which one should yield the
right of way. In other words, no responsibilty would
be placed upon the driver from the left to determine that
he should yield until he first discovered upon entering
the intersection whether he was first there by a foot or
an inch, and at that time it would he too late to avoid
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an accident and he would undoubtedly "attempt to beat
the other car across."

It fails to define what is meant by an "intersection" and leaves that to the speculation of the jury.
The ins~.u... ctwn as given suggests that one may
absolutely rely on the right of way and the assumption
that the other drivers will proceed in a lawful manner
and yield such right of way and fails to consider that
one cannot rely on due care of others after reasonably
put on notice to the contrary. Bullock v. Luke, (Utah)
yet unreported; St. Mary's Academy of Sisters of L. v.
Newhagen, (Colo.) 238 Pac. 21.
Like Instruction No. 14, it purports to lay down
a formula under which the jury's verdict must be for
the plaintiff, but wholly fails to take into consideration
the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence. This
creates an irreconcilable conflict in the instructions and
was itself reversible error.

INSTRUCTIONS DENIED
I. The court erred in refusing to give appellant's
requested instruction No. 7 (Dft. Ab. 117) excepted to
(Dft. Ab. 126). Such a request was proper on defendant's
theory of the case and might have removed some of the
objections to Instructions 11 and 15. As already pointed
out, a speed on the part of defendant of one or five
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miles an hour in excess of twenty-five miles an hour
might constitute negligence, and yet such speed might
well have no relation to the cause of the accident. Assuming appellant was traveling thirty miles an hour, and that
Gerald Franz, approaching from the lpf+ was traveling
forty miles an hour, failed to see app ~~-- ....\until he was
at or near the center of the intersection and failed to
yield the right of way, certainly appellant's excessive
speed of either two or five miles an hour would not
have changed the ultimate result, but only the exact
point of contact between the two cars. Under such circumstances, appellant might have struck the Franz car
at another point or appellant might have turned more
sharply and hit it in the same place, but certainly reasonable jurors or judges under such circumstances could
well conclude that the sole proximate cause was the negligence of Franz. Appellant was entitled to have the
jury instructed on that theory.
Speed was held not a proximate cause of the collision in Wallace v. Yellow Cab Co., 238 Ill. App. 283,
and Geitzenauer v. johnson, (Wash.) 297 Pac. 174, and in
Balvoll v. Pinnow, (Wis.) 208 N. W. 466, plaintiff's negligence was held to not be a proximate cause of the collision. Cases are hereafter cited in which the jury could
find that the failure io yield the right of way was the
sole proximate cause of the accident.
II. Appellant's request No. 13 (Dft. Ab. 119) excepted to (Dft. Ab. 127) should have been given on his
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theory of the case, as shown by the evidence, it appearing
that Gerald Franz, had he looked to the right upon approaching the intersection, would necessarily have seen
appellant's truck approaching and its speed, and at
that time the said Gerald Franz could have avoided the
accident. Under such circumstances, he would have had
a duty to avoid an accident to be reasonably apprehended
and his failure to do so might under the evidence constitute the sole proximate cause of the accident. Under
similar circumstances the jury was held justified in so
finding in Bryant v. Bingham Stage Lines Company,
60 Utah 299, 208 Pac. 541. In Collins v. Liddle, 67 Utah
242, 247 Pac. 476, and W illia~ns v. Globe Grain and Milling Company, 64 Utah 82, 228 Pac. 192, the matter of
whether defendant failed to yield the right of way and
whether such failure was the sole proximate cause was
for the jury. Failure to yield the right of way was the
sole proximate cause as a matter of law in Boerner v.
Wiemann, (Minn.) N. W., yet unreported, and Barrett v.
Alamito Dairy Co., (Neb.) 181 N. W. 550. These authorities sustain defendant's right to have this and other
instructions presented to the jury on the theory set forth
in each request and justified by the evidence that the
negligence, if any, of defendant was not a proximate
cause of the accident and that the negligence of Franz
was the sole proximate cause.
III. The court erred in refusing to give appellant's requested Instruction 14 (Dft. Ab. 119) excepted
to (Dft. Ab. 127), or in fact any proper instruction on
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unavoidable accidents. The evidence presents several
theories upon which this accident could be considered
unavoidable. and it was error to refuse such instruction.
The following cases hold that the issue of unavoidable accident is raised when there is evidence tending
to prove that the injury resulted from some cause other
than the negligence of the parties, as when there is evidence that the negligence of some other party is the sole
cause thereof, or that the accident was unavoidable so
far as the defendant was concerned, and it is reversible
error to refuse an instruction on unavoidable accident.
}ones v. Nugent, (La.) 166 So. 193; National Cash Register
Company v. Rider, (Tex.) 24 S. W. (2d) 28; Dallas R. R.
Co. v. Spear, (Tex.) 299 S. W. 507; Dallas R. Co. v. Brown,
(Tex.) 97 S. W. (2d) 335; Orange & N. W. R. Co. v. Harris,
(Tex.) 59 S. W. (2d) 217; Tyler v. Wilhite, (Okla.) 222
Pac. 997; Alabama Products Company v. Smith, (Ala.)
141 So. 674.
IV. The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
request 15 (Dft. Ab. 120) excepted to (Dft. Ab. 127). This
instruction was appropriate on appellant's theory of the
case and was not covered by the court's instructions. A
similar instruction was held appropriate in Bryant v.
Bingham Stage Line Co., 60 Utah 299, 208 Pac. 541.
V. Appellant's requested Instruction No. 18 (Dft.
Ab. 120) refusal to give being excepted to (Dft. Ab. 127)
properly set forth the nature of the observation legally
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required of Gerald Franz. This was important because
Gerald Franz first testified that he did not see appellant's truck until he was about in the center of the
intersection, and in any event, until he was entering
the intersection, when it affirmatively appeared that at
a distance 17 feet south of the south curbline of Third
Avenue a driver had a clear vision east on Third Avenue
for more than a block. Had the jury been properly instructed as to the type of observation required of a driver,
it could well have found that Gerald Franz, with whom
deceased was riding, could and should have seen the approaching truck in ample time to stop his car and avoid
the collision. In Bromley v. Dillworth, 274 Fed. 267, the
rule of lookout is stated as follows: "He was not only
required to look, but he must look in such an intelligent
and careful manner as will enable him to see the things
which a person in the exercise of ordinary care and
caution for his own safety and the safety of others would
have seen under like circumstances." Defendant was entitled to this requested instruction defining to the jury
a proper lookout and which clearly presented defendant's theory justified by the evidence that the failure
of Gerald Franz to keep a proper lookout was the sole
proximate cause of the accident.
Defendant was entitled to have his case submitted
to the jury on any theory justified by his evidence,
and refusal of a proper instruction, which is requested
on a material issue, on defendant's theory of the evi·
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denc~ affects defendant's substantial rights and is re;
versible error.

Morgan v. Bingham Stage Line Co., ?5 Utah 8?,
283 Pac. 160;

Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pac.
522;

Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 5? Utah?, 169
Pac. 868;

Pate v. Smith, (Okla.) 261 Pac. 189;
Atcheson T. & S. F. R. Co., v. Ridley, (Okla.) 249
Pac. 289;

Smith v. Lenzi, ?4 Utah 362, 2?9 Pac. 893.

Assignment of Error No. 6
The court erred in erroneously permitting plaintiff's counsel to read from a deposition not offered or received in evidence.

It is fundamental that arguments of counsel must
be confined to the evidence and counsel should never
be permitted to argue anything on which no proof
has been made on the trial.
In Dew v. Reid, (Ohio) 40 N. E. '2'18, it was held
reversible error for the court to permit counsel in his
argument to the jury to read from a deposition which
had not been put in evidence.
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ERRORS IN RULINGS ON THE EVIDENCE
As assignments of error 28 and 31 also relate to
prejudicial misconduct of counsel, we will discuss these
first.
Assignment of Error No. 28
Counsel elicited the prejudicial fact from his own
witness, Gerald Franz, that his claim against the defendant "was taken care of," and then the trial court doubly
emphasized this matter by having the question and
answer read over defendant's objection in the presence of
the jury. This was prejudicial error.
As the policy of the law encourages the settlement
of legal controversies, settlements or offers of compromise are not to be brought into the case. "This salutary
rule," it is said in 2 R. C. L., page 418, "which is grounded
upon considerations of public policy, absolutely forbids
that the making of such an offer shall be mentioned or
commented upon by counsel in argument to the jury.
When it is, unless it shall clearly appear from the record
in the particular case that the verdict of the jury was
not affected, the misconduct is such as to require that
a new trial be granted."
In McKinney v. Carson, 35 Utah 180, 99 Pac. 660,
it was held that where evidence of a compromise had
come into the case, it was reversible error, the court
saying:
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"We are of the opinion, therefore, that, in
view of the record, the court erred in admitting·
the evidence. A jury is very apt to seize upon
such an offer as an admission of liability upon
the part of one making it, when the law does not
authorize such offers to be considered for that
purpose."
In Toledo St. L. & JV. R. Co. v. Burr & ]eakle,
(Ohio) 92 N. E. 2"!, it was prejudicial error where plaintiff's counsel in his argument mentioned an offer of
settlement.
,In Demara v. R. I. Co., (R. 1.) 10"! Atl. 89, a judgment was reversed for similar reasons where the testimony on the issue of liability was conflicting.

Assignment of Error No. 31
Counsel's question in the form it was put to the
witness, Norma Chamberlain, being calculated to call
the attention of the jury to a criminal proceeding against
Kenneth Butte and thus arouse the prejudice of the jury
against him, was reversible error in that it denied to the
defendant a fair trial.
In Burbank v. Mcintyre, (Cal.) 2"! Pac. (2d) 400, an
intimation on the part of counsel for the plaintiff of conviction of the defendant was held to be reversible error
in that it undoubtedly had the effect of influencing the
feelings of the jury, the court saying:
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"We believe the general admonition of the
court to the jury to disregard the statements of
counsel and the testimony stricken out cannot
offset the damaging effect of its erroneous admission or its prejudicial effect upon the jury."

Assignment of Error No. 26

It was error for the court to permit Officer Hopkins to testify as to conditions of visibility on the corner
uf the accident in the absence of a showing that such
conditions of visibility were the same then as at the
time of the accident.
In Billingsley v. Gulick, (Mich.) 233 N. W. 225, when
an accident had occurred at twelve o'clock at night,
it was reversible error to permit a witness to testify that
early the next morning at the scene of the accident, there
was a pool of blood on the gravel at the side of the pave·
ment and a deep depression in the gravel for about thirty
feet from the south to the pool of blood, without affirmative proof that there had been no change of conditions
after the accident.
In Trask v. Boston & M. R. R., (Mass.) 106 N. W. 1022,
it was held a witness could not testify as to the dazzling
effect on one's vision of an arc light near the scene of the
accident, it not being shown that the conditions were the
same as those on the night of the accident.
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Assignment of Error No. 2?
This assignment relates to the improper sustaining
of a question asked Officer Hopkins on cross examination. The witness was making an investigation after the
accident for the purpose of fL""(:ing responsibility as shown
by the positions of the automobiles and the tire and
other markings on the highway. Franz had testified that
his car stopped in the middle of K Street, near the north
part of the intersection and had denied driving his car
up to the tree across the lawn, and backing it down off
the curbing. He had pointed out to the officer that that
was where the car stopped and such matters had been
gone into with the witness on direct examination. The
matter was material in at least three particulars: (1) Defendant was entitled to develop on cross examination
whether Officer Hopkins' testimony and conclusions
were based solely on his own knowledge and observations or on what he was told by Franz or others who
were present at the time of the accident, particularly
in the determination of whether the markings and physical surroundings testified to by him had any connection
with this accident. (2) The matter was certainly material
in connection with the question of speed, in ascertaining as to how the Franz car plowed up the grass on the
parking, proceeded north forty-five feet to the big tree
and then returned to K Street, as indicating the car had
been driven with such speed and force as to hit the tree
and bounce back into the street. (3) If Franz drove his
car off the highway and then told the officers that it
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stopped in the middle of the street after the accident,
such false statement would go to the credibility of
Franz and would aid the jury in determining the facts
on which to predicate liability or non-liability.
Assignment of Error No. 29
On cross-examination, in view of the testimony pre·
viously. given and the statement that Franz attempted
to beat the Butte car across the intersection, it was
proper to question Franz as to his knowledge of his duty
to yield the right of way as going to the probability of his
having failed to yield the right of way and also as bearing
upon his credibility. "The possession of the right of way by
one of two motorists colliding at an intersection is a material factor in determining the relative degree of care required." 9 Blashfield, Sec. 6199, page 501, and "it is always
permissible to elicit facts on cross examination of witnesses
which would tend * * * in any manner to discredit
their testimony." 9 Blashfield, Sec. 6298, page 5?'4.
Assignment of Error No. 30
The sustaining of the objection to the question on
c,oss-examination concerning income was error. The
matter of damages had been gone into by plaintiff and
defendant was entitled on cross-examination to go into
that matter in full. Plaintiff could not recover anything
but compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary
loss suffered. This was dependent upon how much plaintiff himself was earning, how -much deceased was earnSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing, and how much Paul and Pete were earning and contributing to plaintiff's support or would likely have contributed in the future~ thus relieving deceased from contributing~ had deceased survived. This was of particular
importance because of the admission of plaintiff that deceased had agreed to assist him financially only until the
next older boys, Paul and Pete, were working. The jury
was entitled to know all of these facts and circumstances,
including the family income, in determining what deceased would have contributed to plaintiff had he survived and the exclusion of this material evidence was
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant
on the issue of damages.
Assignments of Error No. 32 and 33
The only objection to the questions asked here was
that they called for the conclusion of the witness. In
Penton v. Penton, (Ala.) 135 So. 481, it was held the
driver of a car could testify she had the car under control as against the contention that it was objectionable
as being a conclusion. Certainly asking the driver if
from a certain point he did everything that he thought
he could do in that instant in an effort to avoid the accident much less calls for a conclusion of the witness.
Certainly the question of which car reached a point
first is not a conclusion, but is a fact testified to by the
witness and is a proper fact to be brought out, particularly
where the right of way was so important as in this case.
9 Blashfield, Sec. 6199, supra.
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NEW TRIAL
By Assignment of Error No. 25 appellant complains
of the trial court denying his motion for a new trial. All
the points urged on the new trial have heretofore been
argued and reference thereto is made in support of this
assignment.

CONCLUSION
The questions presented by the assignments of
error, argument and authorities cited will in our opinion
make necessary the setting aside of the verdict on the
second trial. Error was committed on account of misconduct of counsel, rulings on evidence, improper instructions, improperly refusing requested instructions, improper examination of jurors, and improper argument
to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence.
Two vitally important and fundamental questions
are squarely presented to this court. The first is important if the jury system is to have any legal foundation,
and the second, if the law is to provide for the fair and
impartial trial of cases. If a court can disregard a jury's
verdict when it is clearly justified by the evidence, then
we should abolish the jury system. If trials should not be
conducted in a fair and legal manner, then we should
abolish the courts and hand the settlement of disputes
to lay boards or commissions unlearned in the law and
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having the

norma~

prejudices of those interested in

tht~

result.
The evidence in this case, in view of the pleadings,
with no positive showing of actual pecuniary loss,
would have justified a verdict of $10.00. The evidence
relating to liability would have sustained a no cause
of action verdict. Two jurors upon the second trial held
out against a plaintiff's verdict. The plaintiff's evidence
showed a willingness on the part of plaintiff to make it
appear, contrary to the facts, that deceased was his sole
support. The jury would have been justified in disbelieving and disregarding all of plaintiff's evidence relating to damage and could have ret~ned a purely nominal
verdict.
We believe the trial court in granting the new trial
erroneously assumed that because a plaintiff's verdict
was returned in a death case that a substantial verdict
was necessary. We believe the trial court without regard
to questionable liability erroneously assumed that he
had an unlimited discretion. We believe the trial court
disregarded the legal limitations placed upon his right
to exercise a sound discretion and permitted his "feelings"
to overcome his judgment and persuade him to act contrary to the duties imposed upon a trial court under the
constitution and statutes of our state.
The entire record is before this court. That record,
in our opinion, clearly sustains the first verdict and
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clearly impeaches the second. The court's action in granting a new trial has placed an unjustified, unnecessary
and undue burden upon the defendant. This court at
this first opportunity should set aside the second verdict, reinstate the first and end this litigation.
While we are satisfied that a retrial of this action
will not be necessary or permitted, the record upon the
second trial is such as to call upon this court to settle
questions of trial practice and procedure that have
caused trouble and will continue to cause trouble until
definitely and clearly settled. Deliberate, premeditated,
intentional and prejudicial misconduct was in effect
ratified and approved on the second trial. This should
not pass the censure of this court. Other errors were
committed and should be pointed out for the benefit of
both court and counsel.
We respectfully submit that the order granting a
new trial should be vacated, that the second verdict
should be set aside, and the verdict on the first trial
reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,

RALPH T. STEWART,
GERALD IRVINE,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant, Kenneth Butte.
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